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Abstract 
[Excerpt] On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be 
the largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date and would be the second largest (next to North 
American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the 
seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea's third largest 
trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and 
investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment 
issues and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South 
Korea. 
The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The 
negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade 
authority, that the Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 
107-210). The authority allows the President to enter into trade agreements that receive expedited 
congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). The Bush Administration did not send 
draft implementing legislation to Congress. 
The Obama Administration has not indicated if and when it will send the draft implementing bill to 
Congress The Administration has stated that it is developing "benchmarks for progress" on resolving 
"concerns" it has with the KORUS FTA, particularly over market access for U.S. car exports. While U.S. 
Trade Representative Ron Kirk has called attention to the economic opportunities the KORUS FTA 
presents, he also has said that if the Administration's concerns are not resolved, "we'll be prepared to step 
away.... ". 
In South Korea, however, the politics of the KORUS FTA likely will make it difficult for the government of 
President Lee Myung-bak to appear to accede to new U.S. demands. This is particularly due to memories 
of events in 2008, when Lee reached an agreement with the United States to fully lift South Korea's ban on 
U.S. beef imports, triggering massive anti-government protests that forced the two governments to 
renegotiate the beef agreement. Lee lifted the ban to make it easier for the George W. Bush 
Administration to submit the KORUS FTA to Congress. The South Korean National Assembly has yet to 
vote on the KORUS FTA, and is debating whether or not to do so before the U.S. Congress acts. It is 
expected that the Assembly would pass the agreement, at least in its current version. 
While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the agreement, the KORUS FTA faces 
opposition from some groups, including some auto and steel manufacturers and labor unions. 
Agricultural groups and some Members of Congress are monitoring the flow of U.S. beef to South Korea 
to judge whether and to what extent to support the agreement. Some U.S. supporters view passage of the 
KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claim 
that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS 
FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. trade policy 
and Asia policy. This report will be updated as events warrant. 
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Summary 
On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS 
FTA would be the largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date and would be the second 
largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States 
participates. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the United 
States is South Korea’s third largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement 
would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA 
covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have substantial 
economic implications for both the United States and South Korea.  
The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The 
negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track 
trade authority, that the Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act 
of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to enter into trade agreements that 
receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). The Bush 
Administration did not send draft implementing legislation to Congress.  
The Obama Administration has not indicated if and when it will send the draft implementing bill 
to Congress The Administration has stated that it is developing “benchmarks for progress” on 
resolving “concerns” it has with the KORUS FTA, particularly over market access for U.S. car 
exports. While U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has called attention to the economic 
opportunities the KORUS FTA presents, he also has said that if the Administration’s concerns are 
not resolved, “we'll be prepared to step away.... ”.  
In South Korea, however, the politics of the KORUS FTA likely will make it difficult for the 
government of President Lee Myung-bak to appear to accede to new U.S. demands. This is 
particularly due to memories of events in 2008, when Lee reached an agreement with the United 
States to fully lift South Korea’s ban on U.S. beef imports, triggering massive anti-government 
protests that forced the two governments to renegotiate the beef agreement. Lee lifted the ban to 
make it easier for the George W. Bush Administration to submit the KORUS FTA to Congress. 
The South Korean National Assembly has yet to vote on the KORUS FTA, and is debating 
whether or not to do so before the U.S. Congress acts. It is expected that the Assembly would 
pass the agreement, at least in its current version.  
While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the agreement, the KORUS FTA 
faces opposition from some groups, including some auto and steel manufacturers and labor 
unions. Agricultural groups and some Members of Congress are monitoring the flow of U.S. beef 
to South Korea to judge whether and to what extent to support the agreement. Some U.S. 
supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the 
South Korean market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough. Other 
observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-
South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. trade policy and Asia policy. This report will 
be updated as events warrant. 
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n June 30, 2007, United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab and South Korean 
Foreign Trade Minister Kim Hyung-chong signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free 
Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries.1 If approved, the KORUS 
FTA would be the largest FTA South Korea has signed to date and would be the second largest 
(next to the North American Free Trade Agreement) in which the United States currently 
participates. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the 
KORUS FTA, if enacted, is expected to expand bilateral trade and investment flows according to 
some studies. 
The final text of the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) covers a wide range of trade and 
investment issues and, therefore, could have wide economic implications for both the United 
States and South Korea. The subjects include ones on which the two countries achieved early 
agreement, such as the elimination on tariffs on trade in most manufactured goods and the 
liberalization in services trade. But the text also includes a number of very sensitive issues on 
which agreement was reached only during the final hours of negotiations—autos, agriculture, and 
trade remedies, among others. 
Congress will have to approve implementation legislation for the KORUS FTA before it can enter 
into force. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also 
called fast-track trade authority, that the Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (the act) (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to enter 
into trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and 
limited debate). The TPA sets no deadline for the President to do this.   
The Obama Administration has not indicated if and when it will send the draft implementing bill 
to Congress. The Administration has stated that it is developing “benchmarks for progress” on 
resolving “concerns” it has with the KORUS FTA.2 During the presidential campaign, then-
Senator Obama opposed the agreement because he believed that it does not adequately address 
problems of market access in South Korea for U.S. exports of cars, among other issues. During 
his Senate Finance Committee confirmation hearing, USTR Ron Kirk stated that the KORUS 
FTA “presents one of the biggest economic opportunities we have of all of the bilateral 
agreements out there.” He added that “the president has said—and I agree—that agreement as it is 
just simply isn't fair. And if we don't get that right, we'll be prepared to step away.... ” 
In South Korea, there is an ongoing debate over whether or not to have the National Assembly 
vote on the KORUS FTA before the agreement is submitted to Congress. South Korea’s 
President, Lee Myung-bak, has said he hopes to have the South Korean National Assembly and 
pass the agreement soon. Lee’s Grand National Party controls a majority in the National 
Assembly, and most observers believe the agreement has the votes to pass. However, an uproar in 
South Korea over the April 2008 beef agreement appears to have made many politicians in Seoul 
wary of trying to pass the agreement before the U.S. Congress votes. In February 2009, the 
                                                             
1
 For more specific information, you may contact the following CRS analysts: William Cooper, x7-7749 (general 
questions on the KORUS FTA); Stephen Cooney, x7-4887 (autos and other industrial goods); Remy Jurenas, x7-7281 
(agricultural trade); and Mark Manyin, x7-7653 (the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship and security issues). 
2
 United States Trade Representative’s Office, 2009 Trade Policy Agenda and 2008 Annual Report of the President of 
the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, February 2009; United States Senate Committee on Finance, 
“Finance Committee Questions For The Record. Hearing on Confirmation of Mr. Ronald Kirk to be United States 
Trade Representative,” March 9, 2009. 
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judiciary subcommittee of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification 
Committee favorably reported the KORUS FTA ratification bill to the parent committee.  
The United States and South Korea entered into the KORUS FTA as a means to further solidify 
an already strong economic relationship by reducing barriers to trade and investment between 
them and to resolve long festering economic issues. The United States specifically sought 
increased access to South Korean markets for agricultural products, services, and foreign 
investment. Of importance to South Korea was a change in U.S. trade remedy procedures which it 
considers to be discriminatory and U.S. recognition of products made in an industrial park in 
North Korea as eligible for preferential treatment under the KORUS FTA. 
Supporters of the FTA argue that failure to approve the KORUS FTA would allow those 
opportunities to slip away, particularly if Seoul’s strategy of negotiating a web of FTAs, with 
South Korea at the center, is successful. As of March 2009, South Korea and the European Union 
(EU) were in the final stages of FTA negotiations. However, some opponents of the KORUS FTA 
have argued that the agreement failed to go far enough in addressing South Korean trade barriers 
and would be a lost opportunity if approved in its current form. A congressionally mandated study 
by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) concluded that investment and 
trade between the United States and South Korea would increase modestly as a result of the 
KORUS FTA.3 This result is in line with other similar studies. In general and in the short-to-
medium term, the KORUS FTA’s largest commercial effects are expected to be microeconomic in 
nature. The U.S. services and agriculture industries, for instance, are expected to reap significant 
benefits if the agreement is implemented. 
Many observers have argued that in addition to its economic implications, the KORUS FTA 
would have diplomatic and security implications. For example, they have suggested that it would 
help to deepen the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The United States and South Korea have been 
allies since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a 
North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over 33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 
were wounded during the three-year conflict.4 South Korea subsequently has assisted U.S. 
deployments in other conflicts, most recently by deploying over 3,000 troops to play a non-
combat role in Iraq. However, some counter this by positing that the KORUS FTA need not be 
seen as a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for enhancing the U.S.-ROK alliance. Mutual 
interests on critical issues pertaining to North Korea and the rest of the region will continue to 
require close cooperation between the two countries in the national security sphere. Indeed, in 
many respects, the KORUS FTA’s fate may have more profound implications for U.S. trade 
policy and East Asia policy than for U.S.-South Korean relations. For instance, some have also 
suggested that a KORUS FTA would help to solidify the U.S. presence in East Asia to 
counterbalance the increasing influence of China while failure to pass it could harm the alliance. 
This report is designed to assist Members of the 111th Congress as they consider the costs and 
benefits of the KORUS FTA. It examines the provisions of the KORUS FTA in the context of the 
overall U.S.-South Korean economic relationship, U.S. objectives, and South Korean objectives. 
The report will be updated as events warrant. 
                                                             
3
 United States International Trade Commission (USITC). U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide 
and Selected Sectoral Effects. Investigation No. TA-2104-24. USITC Publication 3949. September 2007. 
4
 For more on the U.S.-South Korean alliance, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, 
by Larry A. Niksch. 
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The KORUS FTA in a Nutshell 
The KORUS FTA was the product of much compromise. As negotiators from both countries 
stated, each country was able to accomplish some of its objectives, but neither side got everything 
it wanted. For example, South Korea made concessions in agriculture and services while the 
United States made concessions on rice and textiles. Yet, U.S. car manufacturers felt that South 
Korea did not go far enough in addressing barriers to auto imports and South Korea would have 
liked to have more U.S. concessions on trade remedies. 
Some highlights of the results of the agreement are provided below. Background information and 
a more detailed examination of the agreement’s provisions are provided in the main sections of 
this report. 
Agriculture 
Under the KORUS FTA’s agricultural provisions, South Korea immediately would grant duty-free 
status to almost two-thirds of current U.S. agricultural exports. Tariffs and import quotas on most 
other agricultural goods would be phased out within 10 years, with the remaining commodities 
and products subject to provisions that phase out such protection by year 23. Exports of seven 
U.S. products (skim and whole milk powders, evaporated milk, in-season oranges, potatoes for 
table use, honey, and identity-preserved soybeans for food use) would be subject to Korean 
import quotas that slowly expand in perpetuity. 
Much effort went into negotiating provisions covering three agricultural commodities of export 
interest to the United States. Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to eliminate its 40% 
tariff on beef muscle meats imported from the United States over a 15 year period. Also, South 
Korea would have the right to impose safeguard tariffs on a temporary basis in response to any 
potential surge in imports of U.S. beef meats above specified levels. However, negotiators did not 
reach a breakthrough by the end of the talks on the separate but parallel issue of how to resolve 
differences on the terms of access for all U.S. beef in a way that would address Korea’s human 
health concerns arising from the 2003 discovery of mad cow disease in the U.S. cattle herd. 
Though sales of U.S. boneless beef from cattle aged less than 30 months did resume in April 2007 
under the terms of a separate agreement reached in early 2006, sales of bone-in beef (e.g., ribs) 
only began in August 2008 after the conclusion of a difficult series of negotiations—prompted by 
widespread public protests in Korea—on a more comprehensive agreement. This agreement 
requires the removal of specified risk materials known to transmit mad cow disease during the 
processing of cattle less than 30 months old when slaughtered. Both countries view this 
“voluntary private-sector” arrangement as a transitional step intended to improve Korean 
consumer confidence in U.S. beef. (See Appendix A for additional information.) 
The KORUS FTA does not give U.S. rice and rice products any preferential access to South 
Korea’s market. It only requires South Korea to continue to abide by its multilateral trade 
commitments to increase rice imports. Access for U.S. citrus products was not settled until just 
before the talks concluded. With South Korea protecting its orange sector by a 50% tariff, 
negotiators compromised on a multi-part solution. A small duty free quota was created for “in-
season” U.S. navel oranges that would grow slowly in perpetuity. Sales during this September to 
February period in excess of this quota would continue to face the high 50% tariff. For “out-of-
season” oranges that pose less competition to South Korea’s orange producing sector, the tariff 
would be phased out by year 7. 
The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
Automobiles 
Trade in autos and autoparts proved to be among the most difficult issues tackled by U.S. and 
South Korean negotiators, pitting an increasingly competitive South Korean industry seeking to 
increase its market share in the United States and a U.S. industry that wants South Korea to 
eliminate policies and practices that seemingly discriminate against U.S. auto imports. The 
KORUS FTA would: 
• eliminate most South Korean tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles. South Korea 
would immediately eliminate its 8% tariff on U.S.-built passenger cars and its 
10% tariff on pickup trucks. 
• reduce discriminatory effects of engine displacement taxes. South Korea would 
simplify its three-tier “Special Consumption Tax” and would also simplify its 
five-tier “Annual Vehicle Tax” both of which are based on engine displacement 
by making it a three-tier system. 
• harmonize standards and create an “Automotive Working Group.” The 
agreement provides for self-certification on safety and emissions standards for a 
limited number of U.S.-exported vehicles, and a commitment that South Korea 
will evaluate emissions using the methodology applied by the State of California. 
South Korea also agreed “not to adopt technical regulations that create 
unnecessary barriers to trade and to cooperate to harmonize standards.” 
• eliminate U.S. tariffs and provide for “snapback” clause. The United States 
would immediately eliminate its 2.5% duty on gasoline-fueled passenger vehicles 
with engine displacement up to 3000 cc, would phase out over three years the 
2.5% duty on South Korean imports with larger engine capacity or that are 
diesel-powered , and would phase out over ten years the 25% duty on South 
Korean pickup trucks. 
Other Key Provisions 
The KORUS FTA would cover a broad range of other areas. According to the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), most U.S.-South Korean trade in consumer and 
industrial products would become duty-free within three years after the agreement enters into 
force, and virtually all remaining tariffs would be lifted within 10 years. The two countries agreed 
to liberalize trade in services by opening up their markets beyond what they have committed to 
do in the World Trade Organization (WTO). About 60% of U.S.-South Korea trade in textiles and 
apparel would become duty-free immediately, and the KORUS FTA would provide a special 
safeguard mechanism to reduce the impact of textile and apparel import surges. 
Trade remedies were a critical issue for South Korea and a sensitive issue for the United States. 
The FTA allows the United States to exempt imports from South Korea from a “global” escape 
clause (section 201) measure if they are not a major cause of serious injury or a threat of serious 
injury to the U.S. domestic industry. The FTA would also provide for a binational consultative 
committee to review trade remedy decisions involving one another.5 
                                                             
5
 Trade Remedy Piece of Korea FTA Ignores Korean ADF Demands. Inside U.S. Trade. April 13, 2007. 
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In addition, South Korea and the United States agreed to establish an independent body to review 
recommendations and determinations regarding South Korean pricing and government 
reimbursement for pharmaceuticals and medical devices and to improve transparency in the 
process for making those determinations. 
Furthermore, one year after the KORUS FTA enters into force, a binational committee would be 
formed to study the possibility of eventually including products from “Outward Processing 
Zones,” such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, that use North Korean labor. 
Estimates of the Overall Economic Effects of a 
KORUS FTA 
Economists have released several studies estimating the potential effects of the KORUS FTA. As 
required by the TPA statute, the USITC conducted a study of the KORUS FTA at the request of 
the President.6 The USITC study concludes that U.S. GDP would increase by $10.1 billion to 
$11.9 billion (approximately 0.1%) when the KORUS FTA is fully implemented, a negligible 
amount given the size of the U.S. economy. The USITC based this estimate primarily on the 
removal of tariffs and tariff-rate-quotas, that is, barriers that can be relatively easily quantified. 
The study concludes that U.S. exports of goods would likely increase by $9.7 billion to $10.9 
billion, primarily in agricultural products, machinery, electronics, transportation equipment, 
including passenger vehicles and parts. U.S. imports would increase $6.4 billion to $6.9 billion, 
primarily in textiles, apparel, leather products, footwear, machinery, electronics, and passenger 
vehicles and parts.7 
The range does not take into account the impact of the reduction of barriers to trade in services 
and to foreign investment flows and the impact of changes in regulations as a result of the 
KORUS FTA. The study notes that U.S. exports in services would increase as a result of South 
Korean commitments under the KORUS FTA, and that changes in the regulatory environment in 
both countries would also help to increase bilateral trade and investment flows. 
The study estimates that changes in aggregate U.S. employment would be negligible given the 
much larger size of the U.S. economy compared to the South Korean economy. However, while 
some sectors, such as livestock producers, would experience increases in employment, others 
such as textile, wearing apparel, and electronic equipment manufacturers would be expected to 
experience declines in employment.8 
Other studies draw the same basic conclusions, although the magnitudes differ because they 
employ different models from the USITC study. For example, a University of Michigan analysis 
commissioned by the Korea Economic Institute estimates that U.S. GDP would increase by 
$25.12 billion (0.14% of U.S. GDP). This is larger than the USITC estimate, but in part this is 
                                                             
6
 Section 2104(f) Trade of 2002. P.L. 107-210. United States International Trade Commission (USITC). U.S.-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects. Investigation No. TA-2104-24. USITC 
Publication 3949. September 2007. 
7
 USITC. p. xvii-xviii. 
8
 USITC. p. xix. 
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because its authors quantified the effects of liberalization in services trade.9 The authors also 
analyzed the impact of a KORUS FTA before the final text had been released and assumed, 
among other things, that rice trade would be liberalized, which, in the end, was not the case. 
In December 2005, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) published a 
study measuring the potential economic impact of a U.S.-South Korean FTA on South Korea 
alone. The study estimated some of the dynamic, or long-run, economic effects in addition to the 
static, or one-time, effects of the FTA on South Korea. The KIEP study estimated that the FTA 
would eventually lead to a 0.42% to 0.59% increase in South Korea’s GDP according to a static 
analysis, and 1.99% to 2.27% according to a dynamic analysis.10 
An Overview of the U.S.-South Korean Economic 
Relationship 
South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States. In 2007, two-way trade between 
the two countries exceeded $78 billion, making South Korea the United States’s seventh-largest 
trading partner. (See Table 1.) South Korea is among the United States’s largest markets for 
agricultural products. Major U.S. exports to South Korea include semiconductors, machinery 
(particularly semiconductor production machinery), aircraft, and agricultural products. 
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade,  
 Selected Years 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Year  U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Trade balance Total trade 
1990 14.4 18.5 -4.1 32.9 
1995 25.4 24.2 1.2 49.6 
2000 26.3 39.8 -13.5 66.1 
2003 22.5 36.9 -14.4 59.5 
2004 25.0 45.1 -20.1 70.1 
2005 26.2 43.2 -17.0 69.4 
2006 30.8 44.7 -13.9 75.5 
2007 33.0 45.4 -12.4 78.4 
2008 33.1 46.7 -13.6 79.8 
Major U.S. Export Items Industrial machinery; chemicals; semiconductor circuits; corn & wheat; specialized 
instruments.  
Major U.S. Import Items Cell phones; semiconductor circuits; cars & car parts; iron & steel. 
                                                             
9
 Kiyota, Kozo and Robert M. Stern. Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Korea Economic 
Institute, Special Studies 4. 2007. 
10
 Lee, Junyu and Hongshik Lee. Feasibility and Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA. Korean Institute for 
International Economic Policy. December 2005. p. 86. 
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Sources: 1990 and 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services. 2000-2008 data from U.S. International Trade 
Commission. 
South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the United States is on 
South Korea. In 2007, the United States was South Korea’s third-largest trading partner, second-
largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports. It was among South Korea’s largest 
suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2003, China for the first time displaced the United 
States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number one trading partner. In 2005 Japan 
overtook the United States to become South Korea’s second-largest trade partner. 
Table 2. Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence (2008) 
 Total Trade Export Market Source of Imports Source of FDI 
 For the U.S., South Korea ranks # 7 # 7 # 9 # 17 (2007) 
 For South Korea, the U.S. ranks # 3 # 2 # 3 # 2 (2007) 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bank of Korea. 
Increased economic interaction between the United States and South Korea has been 
accompanied by numerous disagreements over trade policies. In general, U.S. exporters and trade 
negotiators identify the lack of transparency of South Korea’s trading and regulatory systems as 
the most significant barriers to trade with South Korea in almost every major product sector. 
Many U.S. government officials also complain that Seoul continues to use government 
regulations and standard-setting powers to discriminate against foreign firms in politically 
sensitive industries, such as automobiles and telecommunications. Another major cross-sectoral 
complaint is that rigidities in the South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance pay, 
raise the cost of investing and doing business. Finally, the United States and other countries have 
pressed South Korea to open further its agricultural market, which is considered one of the most 
closed among members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).11 Many of these issues arose during the KORUS FTA negotiations. 
The intensity of these disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
in part because South Korea enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo 
for receiving a U.S.-led $58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In particular, as a result of the 
reforms, South Korea opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions of dollars of 
foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). The result is that foreign companies, 
including U.S. firms, now are significant shareholders in many prominent industrial 
conglomerates (chaebol); at one point earlier in the decade, foreign firms owned about one-third 
of the South Korean banking industry and an estimated 40% of the value of the shares traded on 
South Korea’s stock exchange. Since the 1997 crisis, FDI commitments by U.S. companies have 
totaled over $25 billion.12 
Additionally, the United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at managing 
their trade disputes. This may be partly due to the quarterly, working-level “trade action agenda” 
trade meetings that were initiated in early 2001. Both sides credit the meetings, which appear to 
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be unique to the U.S.-South Korean trade relationship, with creating a more constructive dialogue 
that helped pave the way for the two sides to feel sufficiently confident to launch FTA 
negotiations. 
U.S. and South Korean Objectives in an FTA 
U.S. and South Korean policymakers shared certain goals in launching and completing the 
negotiations on the KORUS FTA. Both governments saw in the FTA a logical extension of an 
already important economic relationship that would provide a means by which the two trading 
partners could address and resolve fundamental issues and, thereby, raise the relationship to a 
higher level. For the United States these issues have included the high tariffs and other 
restrictions on agricultural imports. For South Korea, these difficult issues have included 
perceived U.S. discrimination toward South Korean imports in the application of trade remedies 
and treatment of products made at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea. 
While sharing some broad objectives, U.S. and South Korean leaders also approached the 
KORUS FTA from different perspectives that were reflected in the conduct and outcome of the 
negotiations. A primary objective of the United States was to gain access to South Korean 
markets in agricultural products, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, some other high-
technology manufactured goods, and services, particularly financial and professional services—
areas in which U.S. producers are internationally competitive but for which South Korean barriers 
seemed to be high. 
For South Korea, gaining a large increase in market access was not as critical a priority since 
South Korean exporters already have a significant presence in areas in which they have proved to 
be competitive—consumer electronics and autos, for example, and in which they already face 
only low or zero U.S. tariffs. However, South Korea arguably did seek to preserve its share of the 
U.S. market in the face of growing competition from emerging East Asian producers from 
Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and possibly China. South Korea likely also aimed to improve its 
competitive position in the U.S. market vis-a-vis Japan where the elimination of even low tariffs 
might give South Korean exporters some price advantage. 
Launching the FTA negotiations was largely at the initiative of South Korea. Its main objective in 
securing an FTA with the United States was much broader than gaining reciprocal access to the 
U.S. market. Entering an FTA with the United States meshed with a number of former South 
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s long term economic and strategic goals. Roh made an FTA the 
top economic priority for the remainder of his tenure, which expires in February 2008.13 Soon 
after his election in 2002, Roh committed himself to raising South Korea’s per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) to $20,000 by the end of the decade and to transforming South Korea 
into a major “economic hub” in Northeast Asia by expanding the economic reforms begun by his 
predecessor following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Ongoing competitive pressure from 
Japanese firms, increased competition from Chinese enterprises, and the rapid ageing of the South 
Korean workforce has heightened the sense of urgency about boosting national competitiveness. 
Continuing along this line of argument, ex-Prime Minister Han Duk-soo has said that a failure to 
adopt significant economic changes will mean that “Korea’s long term growth potential is likely 
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to deteriorate.”14 Lee Myung-bak, who was elected President in December 2007, made the 
economy the centerpiece of his campaign and has supported the KORUS FTA as part of a larger 
program to promote South Korean economic growth. 
During the negotiations, South Korean officials and other South Korean proponents of the 
KORUS FTA tended not to focus on the increased access to the U.S. market. Rather, they 
emphasized the medium and long-term gains that would stem from increased allocative efficiency 
of the South Korean economy, particularly in the services industries. This would presumably be 
brought about by an influx of U.S. investment and technology into South Korea and by the spur 
of increased competition with U.S. firms.15 The President and other senior officials in particular 
emphasized the need to boost the competitiveness of South Korean service industries. An FTA 
with the United States, they argued, will help address South Korea’s increased economic 
polarization by spurring job creation in fields such as medical, legal, education, and accounting 
services in a free trade agreement.16 Some, however, say an FTA will worsen South Korea’s 
income gap.17 Also, during the talks, there were continuous and often large scale anti-FTA 
protests, generally led by South Korean farmers and trade unionists. 
The absence of mirror-image or reciprocal U.S. and South Korean objectives in the negotiations 
is reflected in the structure of the KORUS FTA. Except for some provisions dealing with issues 
specific to U.S.-South Korea economic relations, for example, South Korea taxation of autos and 
the Kaesong industrial complex, the structure of the KORUS FTA largely resembles the structure 
of other FTAs, such as Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (DR-CAFTA), that the United 
States has entered into. This conclusion does not suggest that South Korea did not bring to the 
table its own specific demands, which it did (such as the exclusion of rice) and held to them 
firmly. 
Sector-Specific Issues and the KORUS FTA 
Under the KORUS FTA, U.S. and South Korean negotiators addressed a number of sector-
specific issues. Some issues, such as elimination of tariffs on most manufactured goods, were not 
very controversial and were dealt with in early stages of the negotiations. Other issues, such as 
trade in agricultural products and in autos, were the most difficult and were not resolved until the 
final hours of the negotiations. 
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Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Issues 
Overview 
Attaining comprehensive market access for U.S. agricultural products to South Korea’s large 
market and finding a way to resolve Korea’s continued restrictions on U.S. beef purchases 
(imposed to protect human health following the late 2003 discovery of mad cow disease in the 
U.S. cattle herd) were the two primary objectives pursued by U.S. agricultural negotiators. 
Though South Korea in 2007 was the 14th largest agricultural importer in the world, its farm 
sector is highly protected with high tariffs and quotas.18 This reflects its farmers’ longstanding 
political influence (particularly that of rice producers) and its urban population’s deep ties to its 
rural roots. 
In concluding the KORUS FTA, the United States secured nearly complete access for all U.S. 
agricultural commodities and food products into Korea’s market. However, a breakthrough on the 
beef issue (technically not part of the FTA talks but nevertheless the subject of high-level 
discussions) did not occur until June 2008. This appears to reflected the newly elected Korean 
President’s view that an agreement spelling out the rules that apply to beef imports from the 
United States had to be in place before President Bush could consider sending this agreement to 
Capitol Hill. Several Members of Congress had for months stated that South Korea must agree to 
fully reopen its market to U.S. beef under scientifically based international rules and in 
commercially significant quantities before Congress considers or approves the agreement. U.S. 
agricultural groups, well aware of this deal’s potential benefits for producers, had also 
conditioned their support on the resumption of U.S. beef exports. 
In 2008, South Korea was the 5th largest market for U.S. agriculture, as export sales totaled 
almost $5.6 billion. Under the KORUS FTA’s agricultural provisions, South Korea immediately 
would grant duty-free status to almost two-thirds of current U.S. agricultural exports. Tariffs and 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs)19 on most other agricultural goods would be phased out within 10 years, 
with the remaining commodities and products subject to provisions that phase out such protection 
by year 23. Seven U.S. products (skim and whole milk powders, evaporated milk, in-season 
oranges, potatoes for table use, honey, and identity-preserved soybeans for food use) would be 
subject to Korean import quotas that slowly expand in perpetuity. However, the agreement does 
not give U.S. rice and rice products additional access to South Korea’s market (see below).20 
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With the immediate elimination or phase out of most of South Korea’s relatively high agricultural 
trade barriers under the KORUS FTA, the U.S. agricultural and food processing sectors would 
noticeably benefit from additional exports. The USITC estimates that the increase in U.S. exports 
of agricultural commodities and processed foods would account for up to one-third of the entire 
projected increase in total U.S. exports to South Korea’s market once the KORUS FTA’s 
provisions are fully implemented. Sale of agricultural products would be from $1.9 billion to $3.8 
billion (44% to 89%) higher than exports under a no-agreement scenario. Almost half of this 
export increase would accrue to the U.S. beef sector, based on the USITC’s assumption that U.S. 
beef exports recover to the level before South Korea imposed its restrictions import in late 2003. 
(For information on bilateral efforts that led to a mid-2008 agreement on new Korean rules that 
will apply to U.S. beef imports, see Appendix A.) About 20% of the export increase would 
benefit U.S. producers and exporters of pork, poultry and other meat products.21 In another 
analysis, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) projects that U.S. agricultural exports by 
the end of the transition period (2027) would be more than $1.5 billion (45%) higher under the 
KORUS FTA than would be the case otherwise. Sales of beef, poultry, and pork would account 
for $644 million (or 42%) of this increase.22 
Because South Korean agricultural exports to the United States are small ($249 million in 2008) 
and largely complementary, there was no controversy in negotiating access to the U.S. market. 
The United States agreed to phase out tariffs and quotas on all agricultural imports from South 
Korea under seven phase-out periods ranging up to 15 years. One 10-year TRQ would apply to 
imports of fluid milk and cream, among other specified dairy products. The USITC projects that 
imports of agricultural products (primarily processed food products) from South Korea under the 
KORUS FTA would be from $52 million to $78 million (12% to 18%) higher than such imports 
under a no-agreement scenario. 
Beef 
Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to eliminate its 40% tariff on beef muscle meats 
imported from the United States over a 15 year period. Also, South Korea would have the right to 
impose safeguard tariffs on a temporary basis in response to any potential surge in imports of 
U.S. beef meats above specified levels. The trigger for this additional tariff would be 270,000 
metric tons (MT) in year 1, which would increase 2% annually; in year 15, the trigger would be 
354,000 MT.23 In year 16, this protective mechanism would no longer apply. The 18% tariff on 
imports of beef offals (tongues, livers, tails and feet), and tariffs ranging from 22.5% to 72% on 
other beef products, would also be eliminated in 15 years. 
Assuming that South Korea fully lifts its restrictions on U.S. beef and bilateral beef trade returns 
to normal, the USITC estimates that the phase out of South Korea’s beef tariff and safeguard 
could increase U.S. beef exports from about $600 million to almost $1.8 billion (58% to 165%) 
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above what would be the case otherwise. Under the KORUS FTA, the AFBF projects that U.S. 
beef sales would be $265 million higher as the United States recaptures its historic share of the 
South Korean market. However, its analysis notes that the market share of U.S. beef likely will 
not increase over time. That is because South Korean tastes have developed a preference for 
grass-fed Australian beef, which will continue to be competitive in price against U.S. beef even 
with the current 40% tariff removed. 
On June 21, 2008, U.S. and South Korean negotiators reached agreement on the requirements that 
will apply to Korean imports of U.S. beef and beef products. Imports of boneless and in-bone 
beef, and other beef products, from cattle less than 30 months of age are allowed entry, but are 
subject to various conditions that U.S. beef exporters and the U.S. government must meet. This 
agreement occurred against the backdrop of mounting public protests in Korea against an earlier 
agreement, calls by opposition parties that the initial terms be renegotiated, and the Korean 
President’s apologies for how his government mishandled this matter. The Korean government 
secured these additional changes in order to allay public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef. 
Since mid-July 2008, U.S. beef sales have resumed, but have fluctuated for various reasons. The 
pace of future U.S. beef exports now will depend on how quickly Korean consumers resume 
purchases, in light of the controversy that swirled around this issue and of reduced purchasing 
power caused by the country’s economic crisis. (See Appendix A for additional details.) 
Rice 
South Korean negotiators succeeded in excluding the entry of U.S. rice on preferential terms—its 
prime objective in negotiating agriculture in the KORUS FTA. This reflects Korea’s efforts to 
maintain its stated policy of self sufficiency in rice production, the national sentiment that 
preserving rice production is inseparable from the country’s identity, and the political reality that 
rice farming preserves the basis for economic activity in the countryside. That rice was a make-
or-break issue for Seoul is seen in the comment made by a top U.S. trade official, Deputy United 
States Trade Representative Karan Bhatia, the day after the talks concluded: “Ultimately, the 
question that confronted us was whether to accept a very, very good albeit less perfect agreement 
or to lose the entire agreement because South Korea refused to move on rice.”24 On rice, the 
KORUS FTA would only require South Korea to continue to abide by its multilateral trade 
commitments to increase rice imports. 
At present, U.S. rice exporters have access to the South Korean market under (1) a 24% share 
(50,076 MT) of the rice import quota established under that country’s multilateral World Trade 
Organization (WTO) commitments in 1995, and (2) a separate quota available to all countries.25 
Rice entering under both quotas faces a 5% tariff. Entries above each quota are prohibited—a 
unique concession that South Korea received in the last round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
U.S. rice exports against both quotas have fluctuated, but since 2005 have risen to reach $76 
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million (107,905 MT) in 2008. Future U.S. sales are expected to grow slowly in line with the 
expansion of the most recently established rice quota. 
Though the U.S. rice industry expressed disappointment with the rice exclusion, the United States 
will have other opportunities in the future to negotiate access for additional U.S. rice in Korea’s 
market. This could occur in the process of concluding a multilateral agreement (possibly by 2010) 
to further liberalize agricultural trade in the WTO’s Doha Development Round, and might require 
South Korea to further open its rice market. Also, the United States and other rice exporting 
countries could press for additional access when Korea’s current multilateral rice access 
provisions expire in 2014. 
Oranges 
Differences on how quickly to liberalize trade in fresh oranges were not resolved until just before 
the negotiations concluded. The United States sought the complete elimination of Korea’s border 
protection on all citrus products, while South Korea wanted to retain its quotas and tariffs, 
primarily because of the importance of the citrus industry to the economy of Cheju Island. At 
present, South Korea imposes a 50% tariff on all imports of oranges, irrespective of whether they 
enter within or outside an existing TRQ. 
In reaching a compromise, negotiators agreed to a multi-part solution. First, a small duty-free 
quota would be created for “in-season” U.S. navel oranges (a variety that is not produced in 
Korea) that would enter between September 1 and the end of February—a period that coincides 
with the Island’s unshu (mandarin) orange harvest season. The initial 2,500 MT TRQ would 
increase at a compound 3% annual rate in perpetuity. Shipments in excess of this amount during 
this six-month period would continue to be subject to the 50% tariff. Second, in the first year, this 
high tariff would be reduced to 30% for “out-of-season” oranges that enter between March 1 and 
August 31, and then be completely phased out in stages by year 7. Third, South Korea’s 144% 
tariff on mandarin oranges would be phased out over 15 years. 
The cost of selling to what already is a leading U.S. export market for fresh oranges would be 
significantly reduced as Korea’s high 50% tariff is phased out. In 2008, South Korea ranked 
second (after Canada), with U.S. sales totaling $90 million (100,883 MT). USDA estimates that 
the value of the in-season 2,500 MT quota and tariff reductions on all orange exports in the first 
year the agreement is in effect would be almost $18 million. Over seven years, USDA estimates 
the cumulative value of savings associated with these orange access provisions at $208 million.26 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Provisions 
As found in most other U.S. FTAs, the KORUS FTA establishes a bilateral standing committee to 
address food safety and animal/plant life or health issues that frequently emerge in agricultural 
trade. However, there are no commodity-specific sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) provisions to 
address outstanding issues, such as Korea’s import health requirements on U.S. beef imports or 
Korean standards that have prevented sales of some U.S. horticultural products to that market. 
The Committee on SPS Matters would serve as a forum to implement the WTO’s Agreement on 
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the Application of SPS Measures, enhance mutual understanding of each country’s SPS rules, 
resolve future bilateral SPS disputes that arise, coordinate technical assistance programs, and 
consult on issues and positions in the WTO and other international bodies where SPS issues are 
considered. The text of the SPS chapter specifically states that neither the United States nor South 
Korea has recourse to pursue dispute settlement to address any SPS issue that arises. Instead, any 
matter would be resolved using the formal process established under the WTO’s SPS Agreement. 
U.S. beef producers had argued until the 2008 bilateral agreement was reached that Korea’s 
stance on U.S. beef imports must be scientifically based upon internationally recognized 
guidelines issued by the World Organization for Animal Health, also known as OIE by its French 
acronym.27 Other agricultural groups also have raised concerns about Korea’s implementation of 
SPS measures on food additives and those that have restricted U.S. fruit and vegetable exports. 
This new standing committee potentially could be used as the venue to attempt to resolve future 
SPS disputes, taking into account latest available scientific findings and knowledge. 
Autos 
The export orientation of the South Korean motor industry, combined with the relatively low U.S. 
tariff of 2.5% on all imported motor vehicles except pickup trucks, has made the United States a 
good market of opportunity for South Korean exports. (For a discussion of the South Korean auto 
industry, see Appendix B.) Total Korean motor vehicle exports to the United States peaked at 
860,000 units in 2004, according to U.S. Commerce Department data. It subsequently fell to 
730,000 units in 2005, 695,000 units in 2006, and 675,000 units in 2007. There was a further 
decline of 8.7% in U.S. car and light truck imports from Korea, to 616,000 units in 2008.28 
Hyundai has established a major U.S. assembly plant, thus substituting for some imports. Kia is 
also building a U.S. assembly plant expected to open in 2009.29 Falling imports from Korea 
probably were affected by a general softening of the U.S. market. U.S. exporters, including South 
Korean and other foreign-owned manufacturers, shipped a total of 13,654 vehicles to South 
Korea in 2008. 
In terms of overall market share Hyundai and Kia have become more significant in recent years 
The total value of South Korean automotive exports to the United States, including parts, was 
$11.4 billion in 2008, compared to U.S. exports of similar products to South Korea of $791 
million. That meant a U.S. bilateral deficit in autos of $10.6 billion, a little less than in 2007, but 
growing over the long term from a deficit of $5.5 billion in 2000, and $1.5 billion in 1990.30 
Sang-yirl Nam, in an academic analysis of the effects of the proposed FTA, found in simulation 
models of projected market changes, Korea would always gain relative to the United States from 
bilateral liberalization, “because Korea has a comparative advantage over the United States in the 
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automobile sector; in other words, Korea has been much more successful in accessing the U.S. 
market than the United States has been in accessing the Korean market.”31 
But Tom Walsh, writing in the Detroit Free Press, presents data to show that while the net U.S. 
bilateral automotive deficit will probably not decline substantially, the trends are favorable to the 
United States since 2004. Data attached to his article show that while the total value of U.S. 
imports from Korea rose by less than 1% from 2004 to 2007, the total value of U.S. exports in the 
other direction nearly doubled (up 87%).32  
Through aggressive and successful marketing, Hyundai and Kia together have significantly 
increased U.S. market share during recessionary conditions in early 2009. Both brands saw small 
increases (for Hyundai, of both domestic and imported vehicles) in January-February 2009, even 
while the overall market declined by almost 40% compared to the same period in 2008. Their 
share of the U.S. market jumped from 4.3% in early 2008 to 7.3% in 2009. By comparison, sales 
of Chevrolet’s Aveo model, which is imported from Korea, fell by more than 50% during the 
period.33 Part of Hyundai’s success is attributed to the “Assurance” program, by which the 
company contracts to take back vehicles that it has sold to purchasers who subsequently lose their 
jobs in 2009. Both companies have also maintained sales by heavy use of incentives; Kia, in 
particular, doubled its incentives to more than $5,000 per model, second only to Chrysler among 
all brands in the U.S. market.34 
South Korean policies that allegedly restrict imports of foreign-made motor vehicles have been a 
major target of U.S. trade policy. In 1995 and 1998, the USTR negotiated memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) with South Korea, aimed at reducing formal and informal South Korean 
policies that were said to discriminate against imports of U.S.-made vehicles, and other foreign 
imports. U.S. policy primarily focused on motor vehicle taxation policies and South Korean 
motor vehicle standards, which supposedly did not conform to international standards, or those 
widely used in major markets.35 The import share of the domestic market in South Korea has 
increased since the MOUs were signed—according to data calculated by CRS from standard 
industry sources cited above, total imports grew from a low of less than 1% of the market (5,000 
units) in 2000 to a 3% market share by 2005.36 But such a rate of progress has evidently been too 
slow for both the U.S. government and the domestically owned motor vehicle industry. 
Automotive Trade Provisions in KORUS FTA 
The Office of the USTR states that KORUS FTA, “Includes a broad and unprecedented range of 
focused provisions designed to open up Korea’s auto market to U.S. cars and ensure that U.S. 
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automakers have a fair opportunity to compete in Korea.”37 These provisions may be summarized 
as follows: 
• Elimination of most South Korean tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles. “Korea 
would immediately eliminate its 8% tariff on U.S.-built passenger cars and its 
10% tariff on pickup trucks,”38 Tariffs would be immediately reduced to zero in 
each country for autoparts imported from the other.39 
• Reduction of alleged discriminatory effects of engine displacement taxes. A major 
U.S. complaint has been that South Korea has a steeply ascending vehicle tax 
schedule, with very high rates on vehicles with larger engine capacities, such as 
might be exported by U.S. producers. Moreover, the tax system has a “cascade” 
effect, so that subsequent taxation rates incorporate, for example, the 8% duty 
paid on an imported vehicle. According to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC) report on the agreement, 76% of the South Korean market 
is in vehicles with engine displacement less than 2000 cc, with 54% in the range 
1601-2000 cc.40 Currently, the consumer pays a “Special Consumption Tax” on 
purchase of a vehicle: cars below 800 cc are exempt, cars in the next range up to 
2000 cc pay 5%, anything larger is charged 10%. After an interim reduction 
period of three years, South Korea under the FTA would simplify this to a two-
tier system: under 1000 cc tax-free, anything larger would be taxed at 5%. 
Besides this purchase tax, owners must pay an “Annual Vehicle Tax,” also based 
on engine displacement. Currently, there are five different ranges in this system, 
and the owner of a vehicle with an engine larger than the 1600-2000 cc market 
“sweet spot” pays an extra 10% per cc ownership tax. South Korea has agreed to 
simplify the ranges to three: 80 won/cc below 1000 cc engine capacity, 140 
won/cc up to 1600 cc, and 200 won/cc for anything larger.41 Both of these 
changes would include the majority of domestically produced cars, as well as 
imports, in the highest tax bracket. 
• Standards harmonization and creation of an”Automotive Working Group.” U.S. 
manufacturers have complained that South Korea sets safety regulations and 
automotive product standards in a manner that is closed to outsiders and not 
transparent, and that consequently results in standards idiosyncratic to Korea. 
South Korean-based producers, who hold the lion’s share of the domestic market, 
can afford to operate one line for domestic production, and another for export. 
Foreign companies have difficulty affording the high unit cost of customizing a 
small number of vehicles for the South Korean market.42 This problem is 
addressed in the KORUS FTA (Chapter 9—”Technical Barriers to Trade”) and in 
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an exchange of “confirmation letters” of June 30, 2007 between USTR Susan 
Schwab and South Korean Trade Minister Hyun Chung Kim. Essentially, the 
agreement provides for self-certification on safety and emissions standards for a 
limited number of U.S.-exported vehicles, and a commitment that South Korea 
will evaluate emissions using “the methodology applied by the State of California 
...”
43
 South Korea also agreed “not to adopt technical regulations that create 
unnecessary barriers to trade and to cooperate to harmonize standards.”44 Under 
terms of Annex 9-B, the two parties agree to create an “Automotive Working 
Group,” which will meet at least annually, and will review and resolve “issues 
with respect to developing, implementing and enforcing relevant standards, 
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures.”45 
• Elimination of U.S. tariffs and “snapback” clause. The major commitment on the 
U.S. side with respect to automotive trade issues is the elimination of all tariffs 
on South Korean-produced motor vehicles. The United States would immediately 
eliminate its 2.5% duty on gasoline-fueled passenger vehicles with engine 
displacement up to 3000 cc. It would also phase out the same rate of duty on 
South Korean imports with larger engine capacity or that are diesel-powered over 
three years. The 25% duty on pickup trucks, a residual rate dating from an earlier 
trade dispute with Europe, would be phased out on South Korean products over 
ten years.46 However, the FTA, in Annex 22-A, also establishes a special bilateral 
dispute settlement panel, designed to resolve automotive issues within six 
months. “If panel finds a violation of an auto-related commitment or the 
nullification/impairment of expected benefits, the complaining Party may 
suspend its tariff concessions on passenger cars and assess duties at the 
prevailing MFN rate (i.e., ‘snap-back’ any tariff reductions provided by the 
FTA).”47 The USITC notes in its report that, “The dispute settlement provisions 
restrict the [U.S.] snapback penalty on light trucks ... to the rate for passenger 
cars, 2.5%,” while South Korea could snap back to 8%.48 
Expected Impact and Industry Reaction 
The USITC simulation model of the KORUS FTA estimates that while U.S. automotive exports 
to Korea would increase by a range of 45% to 59%, this would only amount to about $300-400 
million because of the low current baseline.49 It states that tariff elimination “would likely have a 
positive effect on U.S. exports ... further, the overall tax burden on the South Korean consumer 
who purchases an imported vehicle would be reduced, more or less equalizing the total taxes paid 
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on imported and domestic vehicles.”50 It particularly emphasizes the potential gain for U.S.-
exported hybrid vehicles to Korea, though failing to note that most hybrids in the U.S. market 
today are imported from Japan.51 However, as the Detroit-based U.S. manufacturers have plans to 
increase their hybrid fleets and there are no South Korean-produced hybrid vehicles at present, 
the U.S. manufacturers could have a head start on these products (assuming Japanese-owned 
companies in the United States do not also export hybrids from their incipient U.S. production to 
the South Korean market). 
With respect to automotive imports from South Korea into the United States, the USITC 
simulation estimates an “increase by $1.3-1.7 billion (9-12%).” However, it also finds that 
“approximately 55-57% [would be] represented by diverted imports from other trade partners.”52 
Jeffery Schott states that South Korea gave a “priority to eliminating the small U.S. tariff” 
primarily because of Japanese competition. Since 2001, the won has strengthened against the U.S. 
dollar, while the Japanese yen has weakened, creating a disadvantage in the U.S. market for 
Hyundai, whose vehicles must compete against Japanese companies’ vehicles on price. One result 
has been reported significant declines in Hyundai earnings.53 The USITC also notes plans by 
Hyundai to begin producing vehicles based on hybrid technology, indications that Hyundai and 
Kia were studying the development of pickup trucks, and actual exports of a small number of 
pickups to third markets by Ssangyong, a smaller producer.54 Hyundai and Kia do already 
produce small pickup-type vehicles in Korea, but they would not appear to be suitable in design 
or style for the United States.55 
U.S. industrial interests’ views on KORUS FTA may be described as follows: 
• The Detroit “Big Three” are split. Ford and Chrysler are opposed, while General 
Motors (GM) is neutral. 
• Automotive parts suppliers were reported to support the FTA. 
• Broader-based industry organizations are favorable, despite the opposition of two 
major motor manufacturers and some other sectoral groups. 
These views were reflected in the April 2007 report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on 
Automotive and Capital Goods (ITAC 2) to USTR of April 2007. The chair noted that, 
“Generally, the manufacturers of capital goods see [the FTA] as an important milestone in 
providing market access to a country and region historically protectionist.... However, in terms of 
U.S. automotive equipment manufacturers, the outcome is mixed.”56 
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Both the U.S. motor vehicle industry representatives and the whole of ITAC 2 initially 
recommended an “unconventional” approach on automotive issues in the negotiations. It would 
have “precondion[ed] the phase-out of U.S. automotive tariffs on the demonstration of South 
Korean market openness in terms of improved import penetration that is on par with that of other 
OECD countries.” 
Fifteen Members of Congress, including Representative Charles Rangel, chair of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, wrote President Bush on March 2, 2007, with a proposal along the lines 
of the “performance metric” approach suggested by ITAC 2. Their proposal would have delayed 
full elimination of the U.S. import tariff cut for at least 15 years, while U.S. representatives 
assessed South Korea’s performance in opening its market to U.S. exports. A formula would be 
used each year to determine the number of South Korean-produced vehicles that would receive 
duty-free treatment in return. They also proposed a “snapback” safeguard provision on the U.S. 
tariff should South Korean imports in the U.S. market be judged to increase too rapidly. The 25% 
U.S. tariff on pickup trucks would remain in place, subject to a multilateral agreement on 
automotive trade at the World Trade Organization.57 
Despite the fact that the final agreement did “not include a performance metric approach,” most 
ITAC 2 members supported KORUS FTA anyway.58 The Ford Motor Company disagreed. In its 
statement appended to the report, Ford accepted that “some progress was achieved with respect to 
existing non-tariff barriers (NTBs).” But it noted that many of the exemptions for U.S.-made 
vehicles with respect to NTBs were very limited in volume or were temporary, that South Korea 
could continue to use a mix of U.S. and European standards, and that taxation rates were still 
exceptionally high for the types of product foreign companies would most likely export to South 
Korea. On the other hand, the immediate lifting of the U.S. 2.5% tariff on most South Korean 
imports would be a “lopsided benefit” that in effect “will reward South Korean manufacturers for 
20 years of unfair trade practices by the South Korean Government.”59 Similarly, a representative 
of Chrysler testified before Congress that, because of the “imbalance in U.S.-Korea auto trade ... 
we simply cannot support the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement in its current form.”60 
By contrast, a GM statement appended to the ITAC-2 report concluded that the proposed FTA 
“has addressed the auto industry’s concerns.” But “given the current imbalance in trade between 
the two countries,” GM foresaw that in the “near term” South Korea would be the greater 
beneficiary, and therefore GM would be neutral on the agreement. It noted that tax policy changes 
promised by the South Korean government would reduce the overall burden on the automotive 
sector and that there were no caps on U.S.-exported vehicles meeting compliance with California 
emission standards, because South Korea committed to establish emission requirements on the 
same basis. GM also commented that the sector-specific “snapback” rule on tariff reductions was 
a unique and positive addition to U.S. FTAs.61 It should be added that GM’s position is probably 
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influenced by the fact that it has become a major investor in the South Korean motor industry 
through its acquisition of Daewoo. Since the acquisition, GM has increased Daewoo production 
from 310,000 in 2003 to 1.3 million in 2007.62 GM in 2007 sold 67,000 Chevrolet Aveos in the 
United States that were imported from its South Korean affiliate.63 
The United Auto Workers (UAW) union is strongly opposed to the FTA, and its literature on the 
subject includes a joint statement of opposition issued together with the South Korean Metal 
Workers’ Union (KMWU).64 In testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee’s Trade 
Subcommittee, UAW Legislative Director Alan Reuther endorsed the negotiating strategy 
proposed by Members of Congress, described above.65 He stated that the final agreement as 
contemplated instead “would exacerbate the totally one-sided auto trade imbalance between 
South Korea and the U.S. and jeopardize the jobs of tens of thousands of American workers.”66 
Reuther further criticized the labor rights record of South Korea as “very problematic.” He noted 
“numerous areas of worker rights violations in South Korea,” cited in the U.S. Department of 
State’s 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the arrest of the KMWU president 
in 2006 in a protest against government efforts to change South Korean labor laws in a manner 
unfavorable to the union movement there.67 In a February 2008 speech in Washington, UAW 
President Ron Gettelfinger criticized the proposed FTA in these terms: “That’s not free trade and 
that’s not fair trade. That is the theft of American jobs.”68 President Gettelfinger reiterated these 
views in testimony before Congress in September 2008.69 
Both the management side and the labor side of the domestically owned U.S. automotive industry 
have used the word “unbalanced” to describe the benefits that may flow from the implementation 
of KORUS FTA. This may seem odd, given that the agreement has many provisions in various 
chapters dealing with specific South Korean policies and practices, and virtually none on the U.S. 
side, beyond the elimination of tariffs. This could be because the global competitive problems 
currently affecting the unionized, domestically owned sector of the U.S. motor vehicle industry 
go well beyond the scope of this FTA to solve.70 Indeed, given major differences in the profiles of 
the U.S. and South Korean motor vehicle markets, it would appear unlikely that the Detroit Big 
Three, which tend to specialize domestically in the production of larger vehicles, could ever gain 
more than a fractional position there through exports from the United States. Thus, the UAW, 
Ford, and Chrysler oppose KORUS FTA as potentially only adding to the severe competitive 
pressure their side of the domestic U.S. industry is facing. GM has secured a solid investment 
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position in South Korea that it is integrating into its global strategy. But possibly it may not want 
to antagonize its unionized U.S. employees, and has taken a neutral position. 
Textiles and Apparel 
Textiles and apparel are a small and dwindling portion of U.S. imports from South Korea. In 
2007, textiles accounted for 2.2% of total U.S. imports from South Korea and apparel accounted 
for 1.5%. In 2007, the United States imported $0.7 billion in apparel and $1.0 billion in textiles 
from South Korea. South Korea’s shares of the U.S. market for textiles and apparel has shrunk in 
relative and absolute terms over the years. In 1991, for example, South Korea was the fourth 
largest source of U.S. imports of apparel with an 8.0% share, but by 2007, it had dropped to the 
27th largest source with a 0.8% share. This decrease came largely as the result of the surge in 
China’s share of U.S. apparel imports, which grew from 15.1% in 1991, to 33.8% in 2007. South 
Korea’s share of U.S. imports of textiles has held relatively steady. In 1991, South Korea was the 
3rd largest source of U.S. textile imports with 8.4% but had dropped to the 4th largest source with 
7.5% by 2007.71 The United States exports small volumes of textiles and apparel to South 
Korea—$74.9 million of apparel and $279.2 million of textiles in 2007.72 
KORUS FTA would eliminate U.S. tariffs immediately on 52% (in terms of value) U.S. imports 
of South Korean textiles and apparel, and would phase out U.S. tariffs on 21% over five years and 
on the remaining 27% over 10 years.73 Currently, the average U.S. MFN tariff on textiles is 7.9% 
with a maximum applied tariff of 34.0% and with 16.1% of textiles categories already entering 
the United States duty free. The average applied U.S. MFN tariff on apparel imports is 11.5% 
with a maximum tariff of 32%, and 3.3% of the tariff lines entering duty free.74 
The average South Korean applied tariff on textiles is 9.2% with a maximum of 13% and 0.3% of 
tariff lines entering duty free. The average South Korean tariff on apparel is 12.6% with none 
entering duty free and with a maximum tariff of 13%.75 The KORUS FTA, would eliminate South 
Korean tariffs immediately on 77% (by value) of U.S. exports of textiles and apparel and would 
phase out tariffs on 13% over three years and the remaining 10% over five years.76 
The KORUS FTA, with some exceptions, would use the yarn-forward rule of origin for apparel 
imports; that is, apparel made from yarn or fabric originating in either the United States or South 
Korea would be eligible for duty-free treatment under the FTA. The FTA also includes a special 
safeguard provision whereby, if imports of textiles or wearing apparel to one KORUS FTA 
partner country from the other increases at such a rate as to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to the domestic industry of the importing country, the importing country can suspend 
further reduction of tariffs, or it can increase the duty on the imported product to (the lesser of) 
the MFN rate applicable at the time the action was taken or the MFN duty that was in force when 
the FTA went into effect. The safeguard action can be in place for two years with a possible 
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extension of two years but no more than a total of four years. However, the importing country 
will have to compensate the exporting country by making additional trade liberalizing 
concessions equivalent in value to the additional duties expected to result from the safeguard 
action. The concessions would be limited to textiles and apparel unless the two countries agree 
otherwise. 
The USITC has estimated that, if implemented, the KORUS FTA would over time lead to an 
increase in U.S. imports of South Korean textiles of $1.7 billion to $1.8 billion and of apparel of 
$1.0 billion to $1.2 billion, with the major portion of the increase being diverted from other 
countries. The USITC also has estimated that KORUS FTA would lead to an increase in U.S. 
exports of textiles of $130 million to $140 million and of apparel of $39 million to $45 million to 
South Korea.77 
The KORUS FTA would allow some fibers, yarns, and fabrics originating outside of the United 
States and South Korea to become eligible for preferential treatment if the product is not available 
domestically in commercial quantities in either country. The agreement also provides for the 
establishment of a Committee on Textile and Apparel Trade Matters to raise concerns under the 
FTA regarding mutual trade in these products. 
The textile and apparel industry appears split on their views of the KORUS FTA according to the 
Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Textiles and Clothing (ITAC-13).78 Some representatives 
of the textile producers support the yarn-forward rule as benefitting their industry and also 
conforming to provisions in other U.S. FTAs but also argue that it should be broader by including 
sewing thread, narrow fabrics and pocketing fabrics, which are excluded from the rule. Others, 
including some textile representatives and representatives from the apparel industry with supply 
chains in other countries, have criticized the yarn-forward rule as being restrictive and limiting 
trade opportunities. 
Members of the industry are also divided on the lack of cumulation provisions in the FTA, that is 
provisions which allow preferential treatment for limited amounts of apparel woven from 
components outside the FTA area. Textile producers supported the lack of cumulation provisions 
while apparel producers would have wanted them included. They also split on the phase-out 
periods for tariffs with textile producers arguing that some sensitive products were given 
immediate duty-free treatment. Apparel producers argued that all apparel and textiles should have 
been given immediate duty-free treatment. Footwear and travel goods are also covered under the 
FTA. Producers of both categories strongly support the FTA and how their products would be 
treated.79 
Other Manufactured Goods 
The provisions of KORUS FTA affect a wide range of other industries beyond the automotive 
sector and textiles and apparel. Cross-sectoral trade associations that represent broad ranges of 
U.S. manufacturers have indicated their support for the agreement, not only because of the 
general elimination of South Korean tariffs on U.S. exports, but also because of such provisions 
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as those promising to increase cooperation in the reduction of technical barriers to trade and the 
improvement in South Korea of the protection of U.S. companies’ intellectual property rights.80 
Similarly, most sectoral trade associations expressed support, although some noted reservations 
with specific provisions.81 The steel industry in particular was a notable dissenter. 
Capital Goods Machinery and Equipment 
U.S. machinery exports could be the largest single sectoral gainer from the FTA with South 
Korea. According to the USITC’s simulation analysis, the sector stands to gain nearly $3 billion 
in exports if the agreement is approved.82 The tariffs on U.S. machinery and equipment imported 
into South Korea range from 3% to 13%, but U.S. products are already competitive in many 
cases, and already account for 15-20% of total South Korean imports. (A specific example is 
U.S.-made computer-numerically controlled machine tools.) Most machinery tariffs would be 
immediately eliminated; others would be phased out over three to ten years.83 As noted in the 
previous section on autos, the capital goods machinery industry representatives in ITAC 2 split 
with the motor vehicle industry representatives and supported the agreement. The ITAC report 
specifically cited, “U.S. manufacturers of electrical equipment [who] will benefit substantially by 
South Korean tariff reductions and eliminations, where the sector has already returned to running 
a trade surplus with South Korea.”84 The USITC report further noted the export potential of 
electrical-power generating equipment, for which South Korean duties range up to 8% currently. 
U.S. exporters are nonetheless already leading suppliers of turbines, generators and nuclear 
reactors to South Korea.85 The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEA) stated that 
U.S. exports to South Korea had risen steadily, by a total of 62%, since 2002, and that there was a 
U.S. surplus in bilateral trade. It calls for: 
legislators in both countries to ratify the Agreement as soon as possible. While the U.S. 
electrical equipment industry still has concerns relating to non-tariff barriers and intellectual 
property protection in South Korea, the overall FTA package would improve conditions for 
selling there by featuring the elimination—most of it immediate—of remaining tariffs on 
goods in NEA’s product scope.86 
Another major capital goods item in which the United States has a strong bilateral trade position 
is aircraft. Total 2006 aircraft and parts exports to South Korea were $2.4 billion. However, 
civilian aircraft imports are already duty-free in South Korea.87 
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Electronic Products and Components 
Both South Korean and U.S. tariffs on most electronics products, such as semiconductors, 
telecommunications equipment, and computers, are already zero, as they are included in the 
multilateral Information Technology Agreement eliminating tariffs among more than 50 
countries. The United States already has a substantial surplus with South Korea in 
semiconductors: $4.3 billion in 2006 exports, versus $2.9 billion in imports. The United States 
has a small deficit in computer equipment, plus large imports of computer and office equipment 
parts and accessories ($2.1 billion) and communications equipment ($5.6 billion).88 
Sectoral organizations representing these industries supported KORUS FTA. It was argued the 
FTA would extend tariff-free treatment to consumer electronics products and could guarantee 
improvements for U.S. products in South Korea with respect to intellectual property protection, 
technical barriers, government procurement and competition policy.89 
One information technology organization supportive of KORUS FTA, the Semiconductor 
Industry Association, did caution that the trade remedies chapter of KORUS FTA could 
undermine U.S. industry’s use of antidumping and countervailing duty (AD-CVD.) laws (see 
below). In 2003, the USITC found that Micron Corporation, the last remaining U.S.-based 
producer of dynamic random access mode semiconductors (DRAMs, widely used as memory 
chips in computers) was materially injured by government-subsidized DRAM semiconductors 
produced by Hynix Corporation of Korea. The Commerce Department subsequently established a 
44% penalty tariff on Hynix DRAMs imported into the United States.90 
Steel 
The American steel industry registered a strongly negative position on KORUS FTA through its 
industry advisory body to USTR, ITAC 12 (Steel). Its report noted that the agreement “does not 
provide for changes in U.S. AD-CVD statutes” and that each party retains its full rights under 
World Trade Organization rules. However, ITAC 12 objected to “changes to the related legal 
processes” in the KORUS FTA chapter on trade remedies with respect to three “key areas:” 
• By Article 10.7.3, parties are required to notify each other whenever an AD-CVD 
application is filed, and prior to initiation of a formal investigation. They must 
afford the other government an opportunity to consult on the application. The 
steel industry objects to “improperly politicizing] the consideration of a trade 
remedy provision filed by a U.S. industry, in a process that is already transparent 
and open,” particularly in antidumping cases. 
• In Article 10.4, either party must afford to the other an adequate opportunity for, 
and due consideration of price undertakings by respondent companies, “which, if 
accepted may result in suspension of an investigation” without imposition of 
penalty duties. The steel industry is concerned that the provision “would 
encourage the use of suspension agreements and the injection of foreign 
governments into the trade law process.” 
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• The steel industry opposes the provision to establish a bilateral Commission on 
Trade Remedies (Article 10.8) as “unprecedented, unnecessary and would 
provide yet more opportunities for South Korea to weaken U.S. trade law 
enforcement.”91 
The specific details of the trade remedies chapter are discussed elsewhere in this report. Beyond 
these specific issues ITAC 12 also made a number of other critical points. It argued that the rules 
of origin provisions did not follow earlier precedents and there were concerns with products 
eventually being produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex of North Korea. (See the section 
on the Kaesong Industrial Complex.) It objected to the proposed KORUS FTA’s ignoring 
currency manipulation issues. They also supported their U.S. automotive customers’ view that the 
FTA failed to insure adequately access to the South Korean market for U.S.-made motor vehicles. 
On these grounds, “especially with regard to the proposed AD-CVD provisions, ITAC 12 cannot 
conclude at this time that the KORUS FTA promotes the economic interests of the United States 
and provides for equity and reciprocity within the steel sector.”92 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices 
While pharmaceuticals and medical devices (P&M) are a relatively small part of U.S.-South 
Korean trade, they are products in which U.S. producers compete well in the South Korean 
market and ones in which manufacturers see increasing export opportunities as the South Korean 
economy matures. For years, the U.S. industry and government have complained about a number 
of South Korea’s pharmaceutical policies that allegedly are designed to protect South Korean 
industry, which predominately produces generic drugs. 
South Korea is among the world’s top 12 largest markets for pharmaceuticals, accounting for 
about $8 billion in sales annually.93 The South Korean market for medical devices accounts for 
roughly $2.5 billion in sales annually and is expected to grow 10-15 % each year in the next 
several years, in part due to the rapid aging of the population.94 While potentially lucrative, South 
Korea is a market in which U.S. P&M manufactures claim government regulations have limited 
their ability to penetrate that market. 
In 2007, the United States exported $580 million in medical devices to South Korea, accounting 
for 2.3% of total U.S. exports of those products and 1.7% of total U.S. exports to South Korea. In 
2007, the United States exported $373 million in pharmaceuticals to South Korea accounting for 
1.0% of total U.S. exports of pharmaceuticals and 1.1% of total U.S. exports to South Korea. In 
the same year South Korea exported $245 million in medical devices and $128 million in 
pharmaceuticals to the United States.95 
Of major concern was the South Korean government’s May 2006 change in how it determined 
reimbursement amounts. Prior to the change, it maintained a “negative list” system, under which 
products would be eligible for reimbursement unless they appeared on the list. With the change, 
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the South Korean government has switched to a “positive list” requiring a product to be listed 
before it would be eligible making it potentially more difficult for a product to become eligible. 
Announcement of the policy came without prior notification to U.S. officials or affected U.S. 
manufacturers and occurred at an early point in the negotiations placing a cloud over them. 
Despite complaints from the United States, South Korea went ahead with implementing its 
positive list system. 
P&M manufacturers also have cited the South Korean government’s policies on reimbursements 
for pharmaceuticals and medical devices under its single-payer health insurance program. U.S. 
manufacturers have argued that the policies discriminate against innovative pharmaceuticals 
because they establish relatively low reimbursement amounts for medicines thus not taking into 
account the costs that producers of leading-edge pharmaceuticals incur and that are reflected in 
higher prices. The manufacturers wanted the KORUS FTA to establish transparency as an 
important principal in South Korea’s development and implementation of reimbursement policies, 
including an appeal process for decisions going against U.S. manufacturers. 
In response, South Korea agreed in the KORUS FTA to allow U.S. pharmaceutical makers to 
apply for increased reimbursement levels based on safety and efficacy. South Korea also agreed 
to publish proposed laws, regulations, and procedures that apply to the pricing, reimbursement, 
and regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in a nationally available publication and to 
allow time for comment. In addition, South Korea agreed to establish a process for U.S. 
manufacturers to comment on proposed changes in laws and regulations and for them to obtain a 
review of administrative determinations that adversely affect them. 
Intellectual property rights protection in South Korea has been a critical issue for U.S. 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Specifically, the failure of the South Korean government to 
protect from competitors proprietary data that manufacturers must submit for market approval. In 
addition, the South Korean government has, in some cases, approved marketing of some 
pharmaceuticals before it has determined that the applicant is the rightful owner of the patent and 
trademark.96 In part for these reasons, the USTR has continued to place South Korea on the 
special 301 “Watch List.”97 
In response, under the KORUS FTA’s data exclusivity provisions, South Korea would not allow a 
third company, such as a generic drug manufacturer, from marketing a new pharmaceutical using 
the safety and efficacy data, supplied by an original U.S. manufacturer as part of the market 
approval process, without the permission of the original U.S. maker for five years from the date 
of marketing approval for the original product. In addition, if a third party submits safety or 
efficacy information for a product that an FTA partner government had already approved, the 
government is to notify the original patent holder of the identity of the third party and is to 
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prevent the marketing of the third party’s product on its territory if permission had not been 
granted by the original patent holder. In a side letter, the United States and South Korea agreed to 
not invoke the data exclusivity provision until the FTA has been in effect 18 months. 
Furthermore, South Korea agreed of a patent-linkage system; that is, neither government is to 
approve the marketing to a generic drug while the original patent is still in effect. Another 
provision, known as patent-term extension, would require each FTA government to adjust the 
length of the effective period for patents on pharmaceuticals to take into account delays incurred 
in receiving patent approval and marketing approval. The KORUS FTA states that no provision 
would prevent either government from taking measures to protect the public health of its residents 
from HIV/AID, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, by ensuring access to medicines. The 
FTA would reaffirm each country’s commitment to the WTO TRIPS/heath Declaration. 
Reactions within the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries were somewhat split on the 
KORUS FTA. Makers of innovative products supported the provisions that are designed to 
preserve the rights of patent holders and provisions that are designed to make the South Korean 
regulatory, pricing, and reimbursement process more transparent and open to comments and 
procedural reviews. At the same time, industry representatives remain critical of South Korea’s 
new reimbursement procedures and argue that the new system does not take into account the 
benefits of innovative drugs that cause drug prices to be higher. Generic drug manufacturers 
argue that the KORUS FTA does not contain provisions guaranteeing the availability of 
affordable drugs.98 
Financial and Other Services 
South Korea was the seventh largest U.S. market for cross-border trade in services in 2007.99 U.S. 
service providers exported $13.6 billion in services to South Korea. Among them were South 
Korea travel to the United States ($2.5 billion) other transportation, such as freight services ($3.1 
billion); royalties and license fees ($2.5 billion); and other private services, such as professional 
services, business services, banking, insurance, and other financial services ($4.5 billion).100 
However, this amount probably undervalues the total volume of U.S. sales of services to South 
Korea as services are also sold through three other modes of delivery: by U.S. companies with a 
long-term presence in South Korea, by U.S. providers to South Korean residents located 
temporarily in the United States; and by U.S. providers temporarily located in South Korea. 
In 2007, the United States imported $8.9 billion in services, including other transportation ($3.2 
billion), U.S. travel to South Korea ($1.1 billion), expenditures by U.S. military ($2.3 billion), 
and other travel ($1.1 billion).101 This figure does not include services sold to U.S. residents by 
South Korean firms through the other modes of delivery. 
U.S.-South Korean trade in services cuts across several chapters of the KORUS FTA—Chapter 
12 (cross-border trade in services); chapter 13 (financial services); and Chapter 15 
(telecommunications); chapter 11 (foreign investment); among others. A major U.S. objective in 
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the KORUS FTA negotiations was to obtain South Korean commitments to reduce barriers to 
trade and investment in its services sector, especially in professional, financial, and 
telecommunications services. 
In general the two countries would commit to: 
• provide national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment to the services 
imports from each other; 
• promote transparency in the development and implementation of regulations in 
services providing timely notice of decisions on government permission to sell 
services; 
• prohibit limits on market access, such as a caps on the number of service 
providers, on the total value of services provided, on the total quantity of services 
provided, and on the total number of persons that can be employed by services 
providers; 
• prohibit foreign direct investment requirements, such as export and local content 
requirements and employment mandates; and 
• prohibit restrictions on the type of business entity through which a service 
provider could provide a service. 
U.S. and South Korean negotiators agreed to several concepts under the KORUS FTA that could 
apply the agreements provisions to a broad scope of services. The two countries agreed to the 
“negative list” approach in making commitments in services. That is, the KORUS FTA is to apply 
to all types of services unless identified as an exception in the relevant annexes. In addition, the 
commitments are ratcheted—when new services emerge in the U.S. or South Korean economies, 
those services are automatically covered by the FTA unless identified as an exception; if either 
country unilaterally liberalizes a measure that it had listed as an exemption, it is automatically 
covered under the FTA. Furthermore, if one KORUS FTA partner extends preferential treatment 
to service providers from a third country under another FTA, it is to extend the preferential 
treatment to its KORUS FTA partner. 
The United States sought greater reciprocity in the treatment of professional services and thereby 
gain increased access to the South Korean market for U.S. providers. The United States and South 
Korea agreed to form a professional services working group to develop methods to recognize 
mutual standards and criteria for the licensing of professional service providers. Under the 
KORUS FTA, South Korea would allow U.S. law firms to establish representative offices in 
South Korea no later than two years after the KORUS FTA entered into force. South Korea would 
also permit U.S. legal representative offices to establish cooperative operations with a South 
Korean firm to handle matters pertaining to domestic and foreign legal matters, and, no later than 
five years after the agreement’s entry into force, would allow U.S. law firms to establish joint 
ventures with South Korean firms. However, South Korea would still reserve the right to restrict 
the activities of foreign lawyers. 
Regarding financial services, under the KORUS FTA, if a domestic provider in one partner 
country develops and sells a new financial service in its home market, providers from the FTA 
partner country would be able to sell a like service in that market. The agreement would allow an 
FTA partner government to impose restrictions on the sale of financial services by providers from 
the other partner country for prudential reasons, for example, to protect investors, depositors, 
policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed. The FTA would also permit either 
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partner government to restrict monetary transfers in order to ensure the soundness of financial 
institutions. 
The South Korean insurance market is the seventh largest in the world. The USITC estimates, 
therefore, that U.S. insurers would be poised to obtain sizeable gains in a liberalized South 
Korean services market.102 U.S. insurance companies have been concerned that the state-owned 
Korea Post and the cooperative insurance providers—the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation and the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative—are not regulated by the 
Korean Financial Supervisory Commission or by the Financial Supervisory Service, while both 
private-sector foreign and domestic providers are so regulated.103 Under the KORUS FTA, South 
Korea agreed that those entities would be subject to an independent state regulator as opposed to 
being self-regulated.104 In addition, Korea Post would not be allowed to offer new insurance 
products. The two countries would allow a partner country financial services provider to transfer 
electronically information from its territory as necessary in the course of doing business.105 This 
is a provision that the U.S. industry highlighted as being particularly important. 
In telecommunications services, South Korea would reduce government restrictions on foreign 
ownership of South Korean telecommunications companies. Two years after the KORUS FTA 
enters into force, U.S. companies would be able to own up to 100% of voting shares in domestic 
South Korean telecommunications companies, and those companies would be able to own up to 
100% of a facilities-based licensee.106 These provisions do not apply to KT Corporation nor to SL 
Telecom Co for which a 49% foreign ownership limit would remain. In addition, each KORUS 
FTA partner would ensure that telecommunications providers from the other would have access to 
and use of its public telecommunications network for purposes of interconnection under non-
discriminatory conditions and would guarantee dialing portability among other conditions.107 
Those who represent U.S. services providers have been enthusiastic about the KORUS FTA and 
have urged its approval. In a statement, Robert Vastine, President of the Coalition of Services 
Industries claimed: 
We commend Ambassador Schwab and the team of negotiators who secured significant 
benefits for U.S. services providers in this agreement.... Korea is a key market for U.S. 
service companies, and this is a very high-quality agreement that merits swift passage by the 
Congress because it creates new commercial opportunities that will support new jobs.108 
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Visas 
For years, a priority for South Korea has been to convince the United States to ease restrictions on 
the issuance of visas for South Korean business representatives. The visa issue—along with South 
Korea’s request to be added to the Visa Waiver program (VWP), which allows visa free travel for 
short-term visitors—was addressed in discussions outside of the KORUS FTA negotiations. On 
October 17, 2008, President Bush announced that South Korea was one of seven countries that 
would be admitted into the program in 4-6 weeks.109 With this step, the VWP is likely to no 
longer be an issue in bilateral relations. South Korea is one of the United States’ largest sources of 
foreign visitors. In FY2007 there were 811,251 short term visitors for business or pleasure from 
South Korea.110 
General Provisions 
The KORUS FTA text contains a number of provisions that cut across in many sectors in bilateral 
trade. Many of these provisions have become standard fare and have become part of the template 
for FTAs in which the United States participates. 
Trade Remedies111 
Trade remedies, laws and actions designed to provide relief to domestic industries that have been 
injured or threatened with injury by imports, are regarded by many in Congress as an important 
trade policy tool to mitigate the adverse effects of lower priced imports on U.S. industries and 
workers. 
The three most commonly used trade remedies are antidumping (AD), countervailing duty 
(CVD), and safeguard actions. Antidumping (19 U.S.C. § 1673 et seq.) actions provide relief 
from the adverse impact of imports sold at prices shown to be less than fair market value, and 
countervailing duty (19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.) actions provide similar relief from goods that have 
been subsidized by a foreign government or other public entity. Safeguard actions (19 U.S.C. § 
2251 et seq.) are designed to give domestic industries an opportunity to adjust to new competition 
and are triggered by import surges of fairly traded goods. The relief provided in a safeguard case 
is a temporary import duty, temporary import quota, or a combination of both, while the relief in 
an antidumping or countervailing duty action is an additional duty placed on the dumped or 
subsidized imports. These actions are authorized by the WTO as long as they are consistent with 
the rights and obligations of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1994, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement), 
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and the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Antidumping 
Agreement).112 
Many Members of Congress have expressed support for maintaining and strengthening U.S. trade 
remedy laws in the face of growing import competition. As a result, the preservation of U.S. 
authority to “enforce rigorously its trade laws” was a principal negotiating objective included in 
presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in the 107th Congress.113 
According to news reports, the “single most important South Korean demand” in the bilateral 
talks was changes to U.S. antidumping rules.114 This may be due, in part, to the significant 
number of U.S. trade remedy cases brought by U.S. industries on South Korean goods. As of 
September 10, 2008, antidumping duties were being collected on 15 South Korean imports 
(mostly on stainless steel specialty products such wire rod and pipe fittings), and countervailing 
duties were being assessed on 5 South Korean products, while South Korea had 2 antidumping 
measures in place against U.S. products.115 The U.S. global safeguard cases imposed on steel in 
February 2000 (line pipe) and March 2002 (many steel products) also significantly reduced South 
Korean steel imports to the United States.116 Of the 13 WTO dispute resolution complainant cases 
South Korea has brought to date, seven have been disputes against U.S. trade remedy actions.117 
South Korea is also a member “Friends of Antidumping” group in the WTO Doha Round that 
insists on implementing changes to the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements in any new 
multilateral agreement. 
In the bilateral negotiations between the United States and South Korea, talks broke down in early 
December 2006 when South Korea presented the United States with a list of specific changes to 
U.S. antidumping laws on a “basically” take-it-or-leave-it basis,118 but in mid-January 2007, 
South Korean officials softened their stance after accepting the assurances of U.S. negotiators that 
Trade Promotion Authority had granted the Bush Administration only limited flexibility to make 
concessions on trade remedy issues.119 
The KORUS FTA, just as in earlier FTAs the United States has entered into, proposes that each 
party to the agreement would retain all rights and obligations under the WTO agreements—
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meaning that the trading partners would be permitted to include each other in global safeguard 
actions (although, as in other FTAs, it does extend a possible exemption from global safeguard 
measures to either party if its imports are not a substantial cause of serious injury) and to 
implement AD and CVD actions against each other. Additionally, as in earlier FTAs, the trade 
remedies article would also authorize either party to the agreement to apply a transitional 
safeguard measure against imports of the other party if, as the result of the reduction or 
elimination of a duty mandated by the agreement, a product is being imported in increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to a domestic industry that produces a like 
or directly competitive good.120 
In the case of a safeguard, the party imposing it must provide a mutually agreed-upon amount of 
compensation. If the parties do not agree, the other party may suspend concessions on imports of 
the other party in an amount that has trade effects substantially equivalent to the safeguard 
measure.121 
As such, the agreement does not seem to require any changes to U.S. AD, CVD, or global 
safeguard laws, or substantially change administrative procedures required to implement these 
actions.122 However, in an apparent departure from previous FTAs, the KORUS FTA seems to 
require a few additional administrative steps prior to initiation of a trade remedy investigation 
involving goods from the other party. First, each party would have to notify the other if an 
antidumping petition is received regarding the other party’s imports, as well as provide an 
opportunity for a meeting between the parties before an investigation is initiated.123 Additionally, 
the party initiating an AD or CVD investigation would be required to provide written information 
regarding its procedures for negotiating a price or quantity undertaking (known in U.S. law as a 
suspension agreement124), and, after a preliminary affirmative determination is reached, “provide 
due consideration and adequate opportunity for consultations regarding proposed price 
undertakings” which could result in suspension of the investigation without imposition of duties 
provided a mutually agreeable undertaking is reached.125 
The KORUS FTA would also establish a Committee on Trade Remedies (which would meet at 
least once a year) made up of representatives from each party who have responsibility for trade 
remedies matters. Committee functions would include enhancing knowledge of the parties’ trade 
remedy laws and practices, overseeing the implementation of the trade remedies chapter of the 
agreement, improving cooperation between the parties, developing educational programs on trade 
remedy laws, and providing a forum for exchange of information on trade remedies and other 
topics of mutual interest.126 
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As discussed earlier, the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Steel (ITAC 12) believes that the 
procedural concessions made on trade remedies could politicize trade remedy actions, thus 
possibly weakening U.S. trade laws. In particular, the ITAC 12 stated that the U.S. AD-CVD 
investigative process is already transparent and that the pre-initiation notification and consultation 
requirements would delay and politicize the process.127 It also objected to the “undertakings” 
provisions, saying that these provisions would encourage the use of suspension agreements and 
introduce actions of foreign governments into trade remedy procedures.128 (For more information 
on the steel industry’s reaction, see discussion in section on “Other Manufactured Goods.”) 
The ITAC 12 also opposes the establishment of a Committee on Trade Remedies, saying that it 
such a forum would give South Korea an opportunity to attempt to further try to weaken U.S. 
trade remedy laws.129 Speaking in April 2007, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Korea, 
Japan, and APEC Wendy Cutler, the chief U.S. negotiator, implied that the consultative 
committee would focus on information sharing and “will not provide a forum to discuss specific 
cases.”130 She also mentioned that the committee could be a benefit to the United States by 
providing a platform for discussing certain industrial subsidies that the South Korean government 
may be supplying to manufacturing firms, and that negotiators worked out an “accommodation” 
that was beneficial to both sides’ needs on a very contentious part of the negotiations.131 
Kaesong Industrial Complex132 
A consistent and significant goal for South Korea in the FTA talks was securing preferential 
treatment for products made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in North Korea, a position 
the United States adamantly throughout most of the negotiations. Located near the North Korean 
city of Kaesong (also spelled “Gaesong”), 40 miles north of Seoul, the KIC is designed for South 
Korean companies to employ North Korean workers. The factories of 15 South Korean 
manufacturing firms began operating when the site opened in 2004. As of November 2007, this 
number had increased to 52 firms, which employed about 20,000 North Korean workers. There 
are plans to expand the zone dramatically. The South Korean Unification Ministry expects that by 
the end of 2010, about 450 South Korean manufacturers and 100,000 North Korean workers will 
be in the KIC.133 The KIC arguably has become the centerpiece for South Korea’s “sunshine 
policy” of engaging North Korea. 
In the final KORUS FTA agreement, the two sides reached a compromise on the KIC. One year 
after the KORUS FTA enters into force, a binational committee will be formed to study the 
possibility of eventually including products from “Outward Processing Zones” (OPZs) using 
North Korean labor sometime in the future.134 The agreement identifies three general categories 
for which the committee is to develop more detailed criteria: progress in the denuclearization of 
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North Korea, developments in intra-Korean relations; and wages, the environment, and labor 
standards. For the third category of issues, the committee is to consider relevant international 
norms as well as the “situation prevailing elsewhere on the Peninsula.” After the committee has 
developed criteria, the OPZ provisions in the FTA lay out a three step process by which products 
made in the KIC could be incorporated into the FTA. First, the committee must deem that an 
outward processing zone meets the criteria it has established. Second, the two governments must 
agree that the FTA should be amended accordingly. Third, each government must seek 
“legislative approval for any amendments to the Agreement with respect to outward processing 
zones.” The agreement does not lay out the size or composition of the committee, or how 
committee members will be chosen, or the procedures by which the committee is to arrive at 
decisions.135 
In the KORUS FTA negotiations, the United States backed away from the principle of its initial 
position of not ever expanding the KORUS FTA to North Korea-made products, a significant 
achievement for South Korea. At the same time, the United States appeared to give up little in 
substance in the near-to-middle term. The United States apparently would be able to control the 
decision to and pace of any move to grant preferential treatment to North Korea-made products. 
Any perceptions of foot-dragging by the United States, however, may come at a diplomatic price 
if future South Korean governments push for more rapid integration of North Korean industrial 
zones into the FTA. 
Two important issues for the United States in considering South Korea’s demand were the 
conditions for North Korean workers and the income the KIC provides for the North Korean 
government. Some U.S. labor and human rights advocates have argued that North Korean 
workers in Kaesong are being exploited. South Korean officials, as well as other analysts, counter 
by saying that conditions at Kaesong are far better than those in the rest of North Korea. 
Additionally, the North Korean government derives hard currency from several sources in the 
KIC project, including leasing fees and surcharges levied on North Korean workers’ wages, 
which are paid to an arm of the North Korean government agency before being passed on to 
employees (in the form of North Korean won). To date, these revenue streams are likely to be 
relatively small, though not insignificant, given the small size of the North Korean economy and 
its shortage of hard currency. If the most ambitious goals for the Kaesong project are realized, by 
the middle of the next decade the North Korean government would likely derive tens if not 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually from tax revenues and its slice of North Korean workers’ 
wages, assuming the KIC’s current tax and wage structures remain in place.136 Some South 
Koreans caution that the uncertainties over the future course of the KIC project make such 
projections highly speculative. 
Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment is becoming an increasingly significant element in the U.S.-South Korean 
bilateral economic relationship. Over the past 11 years, the stock of U.S.-South Korean foreign 
direct investment (FDI), valued on an historical cost basis, has increased substantially, due in no 
small part to the market-oriented reforms South Korea undertook after its 1997 financial crisis. In 
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1997, the value of stock of U.S. FDI in South Korea was $6.5 billion and had increased to $27.2 
billion by the end of 2007. In 2007, 40% of U.S. FDI in South Korea was in manufacturing, 
especially in computers and electronic products, chemicals, and other manufacturing facilities. 
The remainder of the FDI was in services, with U.S. FDI in banking and other financial services 
accounting for much of this investment. South Korean FDI in the United States has also increased 
substantially in the last 11 years, albeit from a much lower base. In 1997, the stock of South 
Korean FDI in the United States was valued at $0.6 billion and had increased to $13.4 billion by 
the end of 2007. $9.4 billion, or 72% of this investment was in wholesale trade, perhaps reflecting 
the sharp retail facilities to sell South Korean-made vehicles in the United States.137 
Foreign investment has been a sensitive issue in U.S.-South Korean relations for many years as 
U.S. investors have tried to make inroads into the South Korean economy. U.S. investors’ 
criticisms have included restrictions on foreign investment in key sectors, such as 
communications, and the lack of adequate protection for intellectual property. (See section on IPR 
provisions of the KORUS FTA.) Efforts to establish bilateral rules have failed in the past. In the 
1990s, the two countries tried to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), that would commit 
each party to provide national treatment to the investments from the other party and abstain from 
performance requirements for foreign investments from the other party. But the negotiations 
collapsed largely over U.S. opposition to South Korea’s so-called screen quota on domestic films 
and the latter’s resistance to lifting or reducing it. (The South Korean government reduced the 
screen quotas by half just before the KORUS FTA negotiations were launched in February 2006.) 
The KORUS FTA chapter on investment essentially contains the commitments that would 
otherwise have been in a BIT. 
The FTA sets down general principals for the treatment by South Korea and the United States of 
investors and investments from one partner in the territory of the other.138 The principle of 
national treatment—that one party to the agreement will treat covered investments and investors 
from the other party no-less favorably than it treats domestic investors and investments—is 
paramount. The FTA allows each party to make exceptions to the national treatment principle, but 
those exceptions must be specified in the relevant annexes to the agreement.139 A second 
fundamental principal is most-favored-nation treatment (MFN)—the two parties agree to treat 
investors and investments from the other no less favorably than it treats investors and investments 
from third, non-party countries. A third principle is minimum standard of treatment, that is, each 
party shall accord to all covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
The KORUS FTA would set limits on government expropriation of covered investments—that 
they be only for public purpose and carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, and affected 
investors would be provided with prompt and adequate compensation (fair market value). It also 
would require each KORUS FTA partner-country government allow for the free transfer of 
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financial capital pertaining to covered investments both into and out of the country with 
exceptions, such as cases related to criminal offenses. The KORUS FTA would prohibit the U.S. 
and South Korean governments from imposing performance requirements (domestic content 
requirements, export-ratios, import limits, etc.) on the investments from the other. It would allow 
exceptions for measures intended to accomplish social objectives, such as to increase 
employment in certain regions of the country, promote training of workforce, and protect the 
environment. The agreement would also prohibit a requirement that senior managers be of a 
particular nationality but would allow a requirement that the majority of board of directors be of a 
particular nationality. 
Similar to other U.S. FTAs, the KORUS FTA would establish procedures for the settlement of 
investor-state disputes involving investments covered under the agreement where the investor 
from one partner-country alleges that the government of the other partner-country is violating his 
rights under the FTA. The FTA stipulates that the two parties should try to first resolve the dispute 
through consultations and negotiations. But, if that does not work, the agreement would provide 
for arbitration procedures and the establishment of tribunals as provided under the “Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.” 
The USITC concluded that U.S. investors, especially investors in financial services, would likely 
gain from the KORUS FTA.140 (See section on financial and other services.) The United States 
has been the predominate partner in terms of foreign investment and stands to gain the most from 
the protections provided by the KORUS FTA. However, South Korean investments in the United 
States are increasing, and therefore, South Korea could benefit as well. 
Intellectual Property Rights 
In addition to those sections addressing pharmaceutical manufacturing (see discussion above), the 
KORUS FTA contains other provisions on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in U.S.-
South Korean trade. Under the FTA the United States and South Korea would reaffirm their 
commitments under the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement and other international agreements and conventions on intellectual property. But the 
two countries would make IPR commitments beyond those agreements with provisions that 
would: 
• require each government to extend national treatment to IPR holders from the 
other country;141 
• require transparency through the publication of regulations and laws regarding 
intellectual property rights; 
• facilitate the registration of and protection of trademarks and established 
limitations on the use of geographical indications; 
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• ensure the right of authors, performers, producers of recordings to determine use 
of copyrighted products; 
• require copyright protection for no less than 70 years; thus, South Korea agrees 
to extend its copyright protection term, an objective of U.S. copyright holders; 
• protect copyrighted material against piracy and provide penalties for those who 
abet piracy including the seizure and destruction of pirated and counterfeit 
products; 
• protect copyrighted performances on the internet; and 
• protect encrypted programming over satellites and cable signals. 
Labor Rights and Conditions 
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration 
released a statement that provided language to be included in pending and future FTAs, including 
KORUS FTA. Among other things, the statement, or framework, called “The New Trade Policy 
for America,” requires U.S. FTA partners to commit to enforcing the five basic international labor 
standards and would require that the commitment be enforceable under the FTA.142 Neither 
country is to waive or otherwise derogate from its labor statutes that reflect the five labor rights in 
a manner that affects trade or investment between the two FTA countries. Each country is to 
ensure that those affected by their respective labor laws have access to tribunals that enforce their 
rights under those laws. During his nomination process, USTR Ron Kirk stated the Obama 
Administration’s position that the KORUS FTA appropriately incorporates the May 10th 
agreement.143  
Under the KORUS FTA the two countries are to form a Labor Council made up of officials 
responsible for labor matters in each country, that will meet within the first year after the 
agreement enters into force. At least one session of the Council will be devoted to meeting with 
the public in each country to discuss matters related to the enforcement of the labor provisions of 
the FTA. Disputes regarding labor matters under the FTA are to be resolved first by consultations, 
but if those fail, the parties in dispute may take the matter to the Labor Council and eventually to 
a dispute settlement panel if these mechanisms fail to resolve the dispute. The KORUS FTA also 
calls for the establishment of a Labor Cooperation Mechanism whereby the two countries would 
develop and work in areas pertaining to labor rights in each country. 
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To many outside observers, South Korea’s labor rights regime is generally considered to be strong 
for regular workers. South Korea ranks in the top third of the OECD’s thirty members in terms of 
employment protection for regular workers.144 Indeed, for years, a major complaint of U.S. 
multinationals is that restrictions in the South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance 
pay, significantly raise the cost of investing and doing business in Korea. In contrast, U.S. union 
representatives argue that recent changes to make South Korean labor markets more flexible are 
reducing the rights of South Korean workers.145 Korea’s unions have earned a reputation for 
activism; the number of working days lost to strikes is regularly among the highest in the OECD. 
Hyundai Motors, for instance, has experienced a strike every year since 1994. Moreover, strikes 
in South Korea are notable in that they are sometimes accompanied by violence and the 
occupation of workplaces and public spaces (such as highways), to which the government often 
responds with police action. In its comments on the KORUS FTA, the Labor Advisory Committee 
for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC), criticized South Korea for the imprisonment of 
around 200 unionists who were “exercising basic labor rights” and for mobilizing riot police 
against union activity.146 
Korea’s labor pool is divided into two segments: (1) South Korean “salarymen” (salaried workers, 
overwhelmingly men, in large corporations) comprise less than one-third of the workforce. Over 
half of this segment of the workforce is represented by powerful unions. (2) The remainder of the 
workforce is comprised of employees in small-scale firms plus the country’s temporary and day 
laborers. Few of these workers are unionized. The proportion of temporary workers has grown 
markedly, to nearly one-third of the workforce, one of the highest rates in the industrialized 
world.147 These workers tend to receive low wages and receive limited coverage by the social 
safety net, points highlighted by the LAC. Labor markets are notoriously rigid. 
Government Procurement 
A great deal of business is conducted by governments through the purchase of goods and services 
for their own use. Most governments, including the United States have laws (The Buy American 
Act) which require such goods and services to be of domestic origin. However, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now the WTO have some provisions, the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), under which the countries agree to open up some of 
their government procurement business, to foreign companies as a way to promote trade. This 
agreement is plurilateral, that is it only applies to those WTO members that have signed it. The 
United States and South Korea are among the 39 signatories to the GPA. The GPA established 
rules for governments to publish information about contract tenders, including technical 
specification, about qualification for suppliers, the awarding of contracts, with a specific 
emphasis on nondiscrimination and transparency in the conduct of government procurement. 
The KORUS FTA reaffirms the GPA as a baseline for government procurement but would expand 
the criteria to include more contracts. The GPA applies to contracts valued at around $193,000 
and above. The KORUS FTA would apply agreement to contracts valued at $100,000 and above, 
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potentially increasing the value of bilateral government-procurement trade. The GPA applies only 
to contracts tendered by 79 U.S. Federal government agencies and by 42 South Korean central 
and subcentral agencies listed in the annex. Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea would add nine 
more agencies to be covered. 
Environment Protection 
In keeping with the May 2007 agreement on labor and the environment between the Bush 
Administration and congressional leaders, under the KORUS FTA, the United States and South 
Korea would commit to enforce a list of seven multilateral environmental agreements to which 
both are parties and to add to the list when other agreements enter into force. (See the Labor 
Rights and Conditions section above.)148 In addition, the FTA would prevent the two countries 
from easing environmental standards in order to allow firms on their territory from gaining a 
competitive trade advantage. Furthermore, violations of the environmental provisions are to 
handled in the same manner as commercial provisions through the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the KORUS FTA and subject to trade sanctions, unprecedented for U.S. FTAs. As mentioned 
earlier, the Obama Administration has indicated that the May 2007 agreement is incorporated into 
the KORUS FTA.149 
Transparency 
Making information publically available is a fundamental principle imbedded in international 
trade rules and in each of the FTAs that the United States has entered into. For years U.S. 
exporters and trade negotiators identified the lack of transparency of South Korea’s trading and 
regulatory systems as one of the most significant barriers to trade with South Korea, in almost 
every major product sector. Under KORUS FTA, the United States and South Korea would 
commit to publish relevant regulations and administrative decisions as well as proposed 
regulations; to allow persons from the other party to make comments and to ask questions 
regarding proposed regulations; to notify such persons of administrative proceedings and to allow 
them make presentations before final administrative action is taken; and to allow such persons to 
request review and appeal of administrative decisions. 
Institutional Provisions and Dispute Settlement 
The KORUS FTA would provide several options for the United States and South Korea to resolve 
disputes arising under the agreement, in addition to the special dispute settlement provisions 
under the foreign investment chapter and other chapters. KORUS FTA would require the two 
countries to establish a joint committee chaired by the USTR and the Minister of Foreign Trade or 
their designees to supervise the implementation of the agreement. The committee would establish 
a panel to adjudicate disputes between the two countries under the agreement, if consultations do 
not lead to a resolution of the dispute. Annex 22A of the KORUS FTA contains provisions for the 
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settlement of disputes regarding motor vehicles, specifically the snap-back provision. (See 
discussion in section on auto trade.) Annex 22-B provides for eventual discussion of the inclusion 
of products made in outward processing zones in North Korea. (For more information, see 
discussion in Kaesong Industrial Park section.) 
Other Technical Provisions 
The KORUS FTA includes other sets of provisions intended to facilitate market access. Technical 
barriers to trade are standards and regulations that are intended ostensibly to protect the health 
and safety of consumers and for other legitimate non-trade purposes but may through design and 
implementation discriminate against imports. The KORUS FTA would commit both countries to 
uphold their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In 
addition, South Korea and the United States would promote transparency, by allowing persons 
from the other party to participate in the development of standards, technical regulations, and 
conformity assessment procedures. 
Regarding customs administration and trade facilitation, the KORUS FTA would promote 
joint cooperation to ensure compliance with each other’s customs laws and regulations. For 
example, it would require the two countries to adopt procedures and regulations to facilitate 
express delivery shipments. 
Rules of origin define what are goods that originate in the FTA region and therefore are eligible 
for preferential treatment. (Textiles and apparel have separate rules of origin). The KORUS FTA 
would require that goods must be wholly obtained or produced in the territory of both countries or 
country. The FTA would set a regional value threshold to be met to be considered originating in 
the FTA territory and provides formulas for determining the regional values. 
National competition laws and regulations are intended to ensure that one firm does not so 
dominate a sector of the economy as to inhibit market entry and stifle competition. Among other 
things, the KORUS FTA would require that the United States and South Korea inform persons, 
who are subject to administrative actions, of hearings and provide them the opportunity to make 
their case. The two countries would cooperate in enforcing competition laws through the 
exchange of information and consultation. In addition, designated monopolies and state-
enterprises would have to operate in conformance with the agreement and in accordance with 
commercial considerations. 
The KORUS FTA includes provisions to facilitate trade via electronic commerce (e-commerce). 
They would prohibit discrimination against digital products and imposing customs duties on these 
products. They would also require the recognition of electronic authentication and electronic 
signatures and would promote consumer access to the Internet. 
Next Steps, Implications, and the Emerging Debate 
The United States concluded and entered into (signed) the KORUS FTA within the parameters of 
the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002. (P.L. 
107-210). Therefore, any implementing legislation would be subjected to expedited procedures, 
that is mandatory congressional consideration, limited debate, no amendments, and an up-or-
down vote. TPA does not impose a deadline on the President to submit the draft implementing 
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bill. It is generally assumed that the President would do so only when he expects to have 
sufficient support in Congress to pass it, although he could submit the bill without that assurance 
and risk the bill’s failure. The June 2008 bilateral beef agreement allowing for the resumption of 
U.S. beef sales to South Korea removed the last impediment to sending the KORUS FTA to 
Congress, according to Bush Administration officials. However, differences over the implications 
of the KORUS FTA between the Bush Administration and the Democratic leadership prevented 
the implementing legislation from being introduced in the 110th Congress.  
During the presidential campaign, then-Senator Obama opposed the agreement because he 
believed that it does not adequately address problems of market access in South Korea for U.S. 
exports of cars, among other issues. In February 2009, the Obama Administration stated it would 
establish “benchmarks” for resolving these concerns. USTR Ron Kirk said that if they were not 
resolved, the Administration would walk away from the KORUS FTA. During her trip to Seoul in 
February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made little mention of the agreement.  
 
Implications for South Korea and the U.S.-ROK Alliance 
In South Korea, the KORUS FTA must be approved by a majority vote in the unicameral 
National Assembly to take effect. The Assembly is controlled by President Lee Myung Bak’s 
Grand National Party, which officially supports the agreement. Unlike in the United States, trade 
agreements are not subject to any fast-track time lines. President Lee Myung Bak, who was 
elected in December 2007, has made passage of the KORUS FTA a priority for his government. 
Most opinion polls genially have shown a majority of South Koreans in favor of the agreement, 
though opposition has been intense from the opposition parties and rural interests, among others. 
Furthermore, most polls of South Korean legislators show broad support for the agreement within 
the National Assembly, which is controlled by President Lee’s Grand National Party. The KORUS 
FTA was not a significant issue in either the 2007 presidential election campaign, despite the fact 
that one of the major candidates opposed the agreement, or the April 2008 parliamentary 
elections. 
For South Korea, entering an FTA with the United States meshes with a number of Lee’s 
economic and strategic goals. Ongoing competitive pressure from Japanese firms, increased 
competition from Chinese enterprises, and the rapid aging of the South Korean workforce has 
heightened the sense of urgency to boost national long-term competitiveness, particularly in the 
services industries, where South Korean productivity typically lags compared to other 
industrialized countries. Indeed, former President Roh and other South Korean officials have 
argued that the KORUS FTA is essential for South Korea’s economic survival.150 Similarly, if less 
grandiosely, President Lee has argued that passage of the KORUS FTA will help revitalize South 
Korea’s economy. To accelerate Korea’s reform efforts—and also to avoid being left out from 
other FTAs being created globally and in Asia—Presidents Roh and Lee have pursued an 
aggressive effort to negotiate FTAs. South Korea has entered into FTAs with Chile, Singapore, 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
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(ASEAN), and is negotiating with other countries, including the European Union , India, and 
Australia.151  
The United States and South Korea negotiated the KORUS FTA in part as a means to restore the 
health of a critical foreign policy and national security alliance.152 While the talks were ongoing, 
the KORUS FTA sometimes was discussed as a possible counterweight to the bilateral friction 
that was occurring over issues such as how to manage relations with North Korea and the re-
positioning of U.S. troops in South Korea. These tensions decreased markedly in 2007, following 
the Bush Administration’s decision to place greater emphasis on engagement and negotiations 
with North Korea. The election of Lee, who has stressed the importance of rebuilding U.S.-South 
Korean ties, is expected to further improve relations. Thus, with the alliance apparently on firmer 
ground, the KORUS FTA no longer appears as an exceptional area of bilateral cooperation. 
Although the FTA’s utility as an acute salve for the alliance has been reduced, over the medium 
and longer term, some argue it could help to boost the alliance by deepening bilateral economic 
and political ties. The tensions over North Korea policy, which may resurface, have revealed the 
extent to which the two countries view North Korea differently. Most South Koreans’ sense of 
threat from North Korea has declined over the past decade, even as Americans’ threat perceptions 
have risen. With the central rationale for the alliance—deterring a North Korean attack—now 
open to question in South Korea, and with many South Koreans opposed to allowing U.S. troops 
in South Korea to deploy to other parts of Asia (such as the Taiwan Strait) in the event of a crisis, 
the future utility and form of the alliance is being debated. Entering into an FTA, some argue, is a 
way to help reorient the alliance to adapt to the changes on the Korean Peninsula and in East 
Asia. However, in concrete terms, it is difficult to see how the KORUS FTA would make a 
significant difference in the strategic relationship, as it is unlikely to alter either country’s 
fundamental interests on the Peninsula or in Northeast Asia. 
In contrast, while the passage of the KORUS FTA is unlikely to have a major substantive impact 
on the strategic relationship, a collapse of the KORUS FTA would probably have a profound 
symbolic effect, particularly upon the way South Koreans view the alliance. If the KORUS FTA 
is rejected or subjected to a prolonged delay by the United States, it would be a psychological 
blow to many South Korean policymakers, many of whom would likely see it as a betrayal. This 
would be particularly true since, in their eyes, they made politically costly concessions on autos, 
beef, labor, and the environment to help ensure the agreement would be more favorably received 
in the U.S. Congress. The KORUS FTA’s failure in the United States, according to some Korean 
politicians and policymakers, would lend credence to arguments in South Korea that the U.S. 
commitment to Korea and Northeast Asia is declining. If these perceptions take hold, it would 
increase the political costs of South Korean leaders’ taking unpopular decisions on behalf of the 
alliance, such as increasing South Korean payments for relocating U.S. troops on the Peninsula. If 
the KORUS FTA is rejected or delayed in the United States, U.S. policymakers could attempt to 
somewhat ameliorate the negative symbolic effects in South Korea by taking high profile steps to 
expand U.S.-ROK strategic, rather than economic, relations. 
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 For more, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by Larry A. Niksch. 
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Implications for U.S. Trade Policy and U.S. Asia Policy 
The fate of the KORUS FTA could affect U.S. efforts to institutionalize its economic presence in 
East Asia, a goal the Bush Administration has been pursuing in part through FTAs. In addition to 
the KORUS FTA, the United States has an FTA with Singapore. It has been negotiating with 
Malaysia and Thailand, but these negotiations have been slow or dormant. In September 2008, 
the United States announced it would launch negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership Agreement (also called the “P-4” agreement), a trade liberalization 
arrangement among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. The U.S. use of FTAs in Asia 
also has been a response to the plethora of bilateral and multilateral FTAs that are being 
negotiated in the region. None of the actual or proposed multilateral agreements include the 
United States. Failure of the KORUS FTA could be viewed as a serious blow to the U.S. 
“competitive liberalization” strategy. With FTAs throughout East Asia proliferating, a failure of 
the KORUS FTA to be implemented would also likely mean that the United States would be shut 
out of regional economic groupings in East Asia. In contrast, the implementation of the KORUS 
FTA could spark interest of other East Asian countries, such as Japan, to negotiate FTAs with the 
United States in order not to lose their share of the huge U.S. market to South Korea. Thus, if the 
proponents of the “competitive liberalization” argument are correct, the fate of the KORUS FTA 
could play an important role in accelerating or decelerating the move to open market regionalism 
in East Asia. 
Similarly, the fate of the KORUS FTA is likely to be seen as a bellwether for broader U.S. trade 
policy, which is now in a period of re-evaluation. In addition to the KORUS FTA, U.S. FTAs with 
Colombia and Panama are pending and may be acted on during the 111th Congress. The Doha 
Development Agenda round in the WTO is, for all intent and purposes, on life support, if not 
dead. This raises questions in the minds of U.S. policymakers and other experts, regarding the 
future role of the WTO and multilateral negotiations in shaping the international trading 
framework. The KORUS FTA will likely play a role in this reassessment. For better or worse, its 
rejection or indefinite delay might call into question the viability of FTAs as a serious U.S. tool to 
strengthen economic ties with major trading partners. 
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Appendix A. South Korea’s Rules on Imports of U.S. 
Beef 
On April 18, 2008, U.S. and South Korean negotiators reached agreement on the sanitary rules 
that Korea will apply to beef imports from the United States. It allows for imports of all cuts of 
U.S. boneless and bone-in beef and other beef products from cattle, irrespective of age, as long as 
specified risk materials known to transmit mad cow disease are removed and other conditions are 
met. However, to address subsequent Korean concerns, both sides revised this deal on June 21, 
2008, to limit sales of U.S. beef from cattle less than 30 months old. 
Within a few days, South Korea published rules to put this agreement into effect, and quickly 
began to inspect U.S. beef shipments. The U.S. Department of Agriculture similarly began to 
implement a new program to verify that the beef sold is processed from cattle under 30 months 
old. U.S. beef exporters are now working to recapture a key overseas market. In 2003, South 
Korea was the third-largest market for U.S. beef exports, prior to the ban imposed after the first 
U.S. cow infected with mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), was 
discovered. Korea’s commercial significance is reflected in the position taken by several 
Members of Congress, who state that congressional consideration of, and support for, the Korea-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), depends upon South Korea fully opening its market 
to U.S. beef. 
While the U.S. beef industry and U.S. policymakers welcomed the initial April deal, Korean TV 
coverage of the issue and Internet-spread rumors that questioned the safety of U.S. beef resulted 
in escalating protests and calls for the beef agreement to be renegotiated or scrapped. U.S. 
officials countered that measures already in place to prevent the introduction of BSE in U.S. 
cattle herds meet international scientific standards. To address mounting public pressure, the 
Korean government twice pursued talks with the United States to find ways to defuse public 
concerns without “renegotiating” the beef agreement. In late June 2008, both governments 
confirmed a “voluntary private sector” arrangement that will allow Korean firms to import U.S. 
beef produced only from cattle less than 30 months old. Both view this as a transitional step until 
Korean consumers regain confidence in the safety of U.S. beef. 
Exports of U.S. beef (including bone-in cuts such as ribs) resumed in mid-July 2008, and by year-
end reached almost $300 million – slightly more than one-third of the record 2003 sales level. 
Though Australia is the main competitor in Korea’s beef market, U.S. beef exporters did gain 
noticeable market share in the first few months. Sensing a change in consumer sentiment, three 
large Korean department stores (the major sales outlets for beef) began selling U.S. beef in late 
November. Reported sales of U.S. beef in these major sales outlets were strong in December, 
largely due to discount pricing intended to draw down accumulated inventories. Export shipments 
of U.S. beef rebounded in January 2009 in part to meet Lunar Year demand, but have since 
declined. Future sales will depend largely on three factors. These include the price 
competitiveness of U.S. beef compared to Australian beef;153 the impact of Korea’s economic 
crisis on household meat purchasing decisions; and the timing of when other major retailers might 
decide to stock U.S. beef on their shelves. 
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 Between February 2008 and January 2009, the U.S. dollar strengthened by nearly 50% against the Korean won. As 
the dollar:won rate strengthened, U.S. beef became more expensive. At the same time, the Australian dollar has 
weakened against the U.S. dollar, giving Australian beef a price advantage in the Korean market.  
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The anti-beef agreement protests in South Korea have subsided. However, because they eroded 
the Korean President’s political standing, there may be lingering effects on his government’s 
willingness and ability to accept the changes the Obama Administration has said would be 
necessary before the White House will consider submitting the KORUS FTA to Congress. 
For more information, see CRS Report RL34528, U.S.-South Korea Beef Dispute: Agreement and 
Status, by Remy Jurenas and Mark E. Manyin. 
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Appendix B. South Korean Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturing 
South Korea came late to the table of major motor vehicle manufacturing nations. The 1980 
edition of the Automotive News Market Data Book, an authoritative industry source, listed no 
South Korean production in its world table covering the period 1946-78, and no South Korean 
company among the top 50 global producers. By 1988, according to the same publication’s 1990 
edition, total South Korean car and truck production exceeded one million units. In the 2007 
edition, total South Korean production of cars and trucks in 2006 is given as more than 3.8 
million units, which ranks South Korea as the global number five national producer, behind, in 
order, Japan, the United States, China and Germany. Yet South Korea remains only a mid-level 
consumer of motor vehicles. Its national sales of 1.2 million ranked its market not only well 
behind the top three leading producers, but also behind each of the five largest western European 
nations, plus Russia, Brazil, India, and Canada, and just ahead of Mexico. Exports account for 
about 70% of Korea’s motor vehicle production volume, a figure that is matched by no other 
major motor vehicle producing country. 
South Korea has aggressively developed and protected a nationally owned automotive 
manufacturing base. Motor vehicle imports were prohibited in South Korea until 1987, and 
imports from Japan were banned until 1999.154 Originally the South Korean government 
promoted the development of a fleet of domestically owned producers, but this strategy failed. In 
the shakeout after Korea’s economic crisis of 1997-98, only one major South Korean-owned 
company was left, Hyundai, which also took control of the number-two producer by volume, Kia. 
Others were marginalized, out of the business altogether, or controlled by foreign companies. 
Korea’s third producer, and their only other major manufacturer left in the business, Daewoo, is 
now controlled by General Motors.155 The lone major South Korean-owned producer, the 
Hyundai-Kia combination, in 2006 produced 3.8 million vehicles worldwide, ranking it number 
six globally. Of this output, 2.7 million vehicles were manufactured in South Korea, 72% of the 
country’s total output of cars and light trucks, and more than double the total sales of all vehicles 
in South Korea.156 
While Hyundai is a world-class global competitor, with current and planned assembly operations 
in the United States and other countries, it is questionable whether Hyundai, or any other South 
Korean-owned firm, could maintain an independently operated market base in South Korea 
without continued formal and informal protection from the national government. Comparative 
analysis of motor vehicle import and sales data by CRS from the Automotive News Global Market 
Data Book and Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures indicates that import penetration in the 
South Korean market in 2005 was equal to 3% of sales, even lower than the 5% level in Japan. 
By comparison, the U.S. level was 39% (20% if imports from Canada and Mexico are excluded), 
and in major European producer countries, Canada, and Mexico, the shares of imports were 50% 
or higher. The British authors Maxton and Wormald believe that the South Korean industry may 
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 USITC. Industry and Trade Summary: Motor Vehicles (USITC Publication 3545, September 2002), p. 60. 
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 Ibid., pp. 60-61; Graeme P. Maxton and John Wormald, Time for a Model Change: Re-Engineering the Global 
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be fated to become a “networked” producer in the long run, i.e., surviving only by linkages to 
other major market producers.157 
Jeffery Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has presented an analysis of 
South Korean automotive production and shipments in 2005, based on Korean official statistics, 
which illustrates that large shares of South Korean vehicles of all types are exported. Among 
passenger cars, however, the significance of exports tends to decline with the size of the vehicle. 
The export share of South Korean-produced vehicles officially described as “light” was 69%, and 
of “small” vehicles was 82%. For “medium” cars, the export share dropped to 62%, and for 
“large” cars, the share was 53%. Schott noted that Ford and Chrysler representatives “argue that 
South Korean tariff and nontariff barriers have restricted the supply of imported large vehicles—
which traditionally have higher profit margins—to reserve a large share of the market for 
domestic producers ... a surprisingly high percentage of South Korean production of larger cars is 
sold in the domestic market rather than exported, and these are cars that most directly compete 
with imports.”158 
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